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Abstract—The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an inter-
national standard for a security chip that can be used for the
management of cryptographic keys and for remote attestation.
The specification of the most recent TPM 2.0 interfaces for
direct anonymous attestation unfortunately has a number of
severe shortcomings. First of all, they do not allow for security
proofs (indeed, the published proofs are incorrect). Second, they
provide a Diffie-Hellman oracle w.r.t. the secret key of the TPM,
weakening the security and preventing forward anonymity of
attestations. Fixes to these problems have been proposed, but
they create new issues: they enable a fraudulent TPM to encode
information into an attestation signature, which could be used
to break anonymity or to leak the secret key. Furthermore,
all proposed ways to remove the Diffie-Hellman oracle either
strongly limit the functionality of the TPM or would require
significant changes to the TPM 2.0 interfaces. In this paper we
provide a better specification of the TPM 2.0 interfaces that
addresses these problems and requires only minimal changes to
the current TPM 2.0 commands. We then show how to use the
revised interfaces to build q-SDH- and LRSW-based anonymous
attestation schemes, and prove their security. We finally discuss
how to obtain other schemes addressing different use cases such
as key-binding for U-Prove and e-cash.
1. INTRODUCTION
The amount of devices connected to the Internet grows
rapidly and securing these devices and our electronic infras-
tructure becomes increasingly difficult, in particular because
a large fraction of devices cannot be managed by security
professional nor can they be protected by firewalls. One
approach to achieve better security is to equip these devices
with a root of trust, such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM),
a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), and Software Guard
Extensions (SGX), and then have that root of trust attest to the
state of the device or to computations made. When doing such
attestations, it is crucial that they be privacy-protecting. On the
one hand, to protect the privacy of users of such devices, and
on the other hand, to minimize the information available to
attackers. Realizing this, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
has developed a protocol called direct anonymous attestation
(DAA) [1] and included it in their TPM 1.2 specification [2].
The protocol allows a device to authenticate as a genuine
device (i.e., that it is certified by the manufacturer) and attest
to messages without the different attestations being linkable
to each other and has since been implemented in millions of
chips.
Later, Brickell and Li [3] proposed a scheme called
Enhanced-privacy ID (EPID) that is based on elliptic curves
and adds signature-based revocation which is a revocation
capability based on a previous signature of a platform. This
scheme has become Intel’s recommendation for attestation
of a trusted system, has been incorporated in Intel chipsets
and processors, and is recommended by Intel to serve as the
industry standard for authentication in the Internet of Things.
Being based on elliptic curves, EPID is much more efficient
than the original RSA-based DAA scheme. Therefore, the
TCG has revised the specification of the TPM and switched
to elliptic curve-based attestation schemes [4], [5]. The design
idea of this new specification is rather beautiful: the TPM only
executes a simple core protocol that can be extended to build
different attestation schemes. Essentially, the core protocol is
a Schnorr proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm [6], the
discrete logarithm being the secret key stored and protected
inside the TPM. Chen and Li [5] describe how to extend this
proof of knowledge to DAA schemes, one based on the q-
SDH assumption [14] and one based on the LRSW assumption
[15]. The idea here is that the host in which the TPM is
embedded extends the protocol messages output by the TPM
into messages of the DAA protocol. They further show how
to extend it to realize device-bound U-Prove [7], so that the
U-Prove user secret key is the one stored inside the TPM.
Unfortunately, the core protocol as specified has severe
shortcomings. First, the random oracle based security proof
for attestation unforgeability by Chen and Li is flawed [8] and
indeed it seems impossible to prove that a host cannot attest
to a message without involving the TPM. Second, the core
protocol can be abused as a Diffie-Hellman oracle w.r.t. the
secret key tsk inside the TPM. It was shown that such an
oracle weakens the security, as it leaks a lot of information
about tsk [26]. Further, the presence of the oracle prevents
forward anonymity, as an attacker compromising a host can
identify the attestations stemming from this host.
These issues were all pointed out in the literature before
and fixes have been proposed [8]–[10]. However, the proposed
fixes either introduce new problems or are hard to realize. Xi
et al. [8] propose a change to the TPM specification that allows
one to prove the unforgeability of TPM-based attestations.
This change introduces a subliminal channel though, i.e., a
subverted TPM could now embed information into the values
it produces and thereby into the final attestation. This covert
channel could be used to break anonymity of the platform and
its user, or to leak the secret key held in the TPM. The pro-
posed fixes to remove the static Diffie-Hellman oracle [8]–[10]
either require substantial changes to the TPM to the extend that
they are not implementable, or restrict the functionality of the
TPM too much, excluding some major DAA schemes from
being supported. For instance, it was priorly proposed to have
the host prove in zero knowledge that a new base is safe to
use for the TPM, who then needs to verify that proof. This
does not only take a heavy toll on the resources of the TPM
but also excludes signature-based revocation, thus not meeting
the requirements of the TCG. We refer to Sec. 3 for a detailed
discussion of the existing proposals and their shortcomings.
Our Contributions. In this paper we provide a new specifi-
cation of the DAA-related interfaces of the TPM that requires
only minimal changes to the current TPM 2.0 commands. It
is the first one that addresses all the issues discussed and that
can easily be implemented on a TPM. We then show what
kind of proof of knowledge statements can be proven with
the help of our new TPM interfaces and how to build secure
DAA schemes with them. Our specification supports both
LRSW-based and q-SDH-based direct anonymous attestation,
signature-based revocation, and extensions to attributes. Our
LRSW-based scheme has a new way to issue credentials that
is much more efficient than prior ones that aimed to avoid
a DH-oracle in the TPM interfaces. To achieve this, we use
a slight modification of the LRSW assumption (which we
prove to hold in the generic group model). Avoiding this
modification would be possible, but requires a second round
of communication with the issuer.
We further show how to extend the DAA schemes to support
attributes and signature-based revocation and give security
proofs for all of that. For space reasons, we give only sketches
in this extended abstract and refer to the full version of this
paper for the detailed proofs. The TPM interfaces that we give
can also be used to realize other schemes, such as device-
bound U-Prove [7] and e-cash [11], for which it is beneficial
that a secret key be kept securely inside a TPM.
To make the construction of such schemes easier, we give
for the first time a thorough characterization of statements that
can be proven with a TPM w.r.t. a secret key inside the TPM.
We provide a generic protocol that orchestrates our new TPM
interfaces and allows one to generate TPM-based proofs for
a wide class of statements. We further prove the security of
such generated TPM-based proofs. This facilitates the use of
the TPM interfaces for protocol designers who can simply use
our generic proof protocol to devise more complex protocols.
Some of the changes to the TPM 2.0 interfaces we propose
have already been adopted by the TCG and will appear in
the forthcoming revision of the TPM 2.0 specifications. The
remaining changes are currently under review by the TPM
working group. Furthermore, the authors are in discussion
with the other bodies standardizing DAA protocols to adopt
our changes and schemes, in particular ISO w.r.t. to ISO/IEC
20008-2, Intel for EPID, and with the FIDO alliance for their
specification of anonymous attestation [34], so that all of
these standards will define provably secure protocols that are
compatible with each other.
Outline. We start by presenting the necessary preliminaries
in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we describe the current TPM 2.0
commands and their inherent security issues and also discuss
how previous work aims to overcome these problems. Sec. 4
then presents our proposed changes to the TPM 2.0 specifi-
cation and our generic proof protocol to create TPM-based
attestations. How to build direct anonymous attestation with
signature-based revocation and attributes is described in Sec. 5.
We discuss forward anonymity separately in Sec. 6, show
other applications of the revised TPM interfaces in Sec. 7,
and conclude in Sec. 8.
2. BUILDING BLOCKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This section introduces the notation for signature proofs of
knowledge and the complexity assumptions required for our
schemes. Here we also present the new generalized version of
the LRSW assumption.
2.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2, and GT be groups of prime order p. A bilinear
map e : G1 × G2 → GT must satisfy bilinearity, i.e.,
e(gx1 , g
y
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
xy for all x, y ∈ Zq; non-degeneracy, i.e.,
for all generators g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, e(g1, g2) generates
GT ; and efficiency, i.e., there exists an efficient algorithm
G(1τ ) that outputs the bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
and an efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b) for any a ∈ G1,
b ∈ G2.
Galbraith et al. [12] distinguish three types of pairings:
Type-1, in which G1 = G2; Type-2, in which G1 6= G2 and
there exists an efficient isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1; and Type-
3, in which G1 6= G2 and no such isomorphism exists. Type-
3 pairings currently allow for the most efficient operations
in G1 given a security level using Barreto-Naehrig curves
with a high embedding degree [13]. Therefore it is desirable
to describe a cryptographic scheme in a Type-3 setting, i.e.,
without assuming G1 = G2 or the existence of an efficient
isomorphism from G2 to G1.
2.2 Complexity Assumptions
We recall some existing complexity assumptions and intro-
duce a variation of one of them (which we prove to hold in
the generic group model). Let G(1τ ) generate random groups
G1 = 〈g1〉, G2 = 〈g2〉, GT = 〈e(g1, g2)〉, all of prime order
p where p has bith length τ , with bilinear map e.
Recall the q-SDH assumption [14] and the LRSW assump-
tion [15] in a bilinear group.
Assumption 1 (q-SDH). Define the advantage of A as:
Adv(A) = Pr
[
(G1,G2,GT , e, q)← G(1τ ), x←$ Z∗p,
(c, h)← A(g1, gx1 , g(x
2)
1 , . . . , g
(xq)
1 , g2, g
x
2 ) : h = g
1
x+c
1
]
.
No PPT adversary has Adv(A) non-negligible in τ .
Assumption 2 (LRSW). Let X = gx2 and Y = g
y
2 , and let
OX,Y (·) be an oracle that, on input a value m ∈ Zp, outputs
a triple (a, ay, ax+xym) for a randomly chosen a. Define the
advantage of A as follows:
Adv(A) = Pr
[
(G1,G2,GT , e, q)← G(1τ ), (x, y)←$ Z2p,
X ← gx2 , Y ← gy2 , (a, b, c,m)← AOX,Y (·)(X,Y ) :
m 6∈ Q ∧ a ∈ G1 ∧ a 6= 1G1 ∧ b = ay ∧ c = ax+xym
]
.
No PPT adversary has Adv(A) non-negligible in τ .
We introduce a generalized version of the LRSW assump-
tion where we split the oracle OX,Y into one that first gives
the values a and b, the two elements that do not depend on the
message, and one that later provides c upon input of m. That
is, after receiving a, b, the adversary may specify a message
m to receive c = ax+xym.
Assumption 3 (Generalized LRSW). Let X = gx2 and Y =
gy2 , and let Oa,bX (·) return (a, b) with a ←$ G1 and b ← ay .
Let OcX,Y (·) on input (a, b,m), with (a, b) generated by Oa,bX,Y ,
output c = ax+xym. It ignores queries with input (a, b) not
generated by Oa,bX,Y or inputs (a, b) that were queried before.
Define the advantage of A as follows.
Adv(A) = Pr
[
(G1,G2,GT , e, q)← G(1τ ), (x, y)←$ Z2p,
X ← gx2 , Y ← gy2 , (a, b, c,m)← AO
a,b
X (·),OcX,Y (·)(X,Y ) :
m 6∈ Q ∧ a ∈ G1 ∧ a 6= 1G1 ∧ b = ay ∧ c = ax+xym
]
No PPT adversary has Adv(A) non-negligible in τ .
Note that our assumption implies the LRSW assumption,
but the contrary is not true. In our assumption, the adversary
may let m depend on (a, b). Intuitively, it is clear that this
does not give any meaningful advantage, as a is random in
G1. We formalize this intuition and prove that Assumption 3
holds in Shoup’s generic group model [16] in the full version
of this paper.
2.3 Proof Protocols
For zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of discrete loga-
rithms and statements about them, we will follow the notation
introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [19] and formally de-
fined by Camenisch, Kiayias, and Yung [20]. For instance,
PK{(a) : y = ga} denotes a “zero-knowledge Proof of
Knowledge of integer a such that y = ga holds.” SPK{. . .}(m)
denotes a signature proof of knowledge on m, that is a non-
interactive transformation of a zero-knowledge proof PK with
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [21] in the random oracle model [22].
(S)PK protocols have three moves: In the first move the
prover sends to the verifier what is often referred to as a
commitment message or t-values. In the second move, the
verifier sends a random challenge c to which the prover
responds with the so-called s-values.
When describing our protocols at a high-level, we use
the following, more abstract notation. By NIZK{(w) :
statement(w)}(ctxt) we denote any non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof that is bound to a certain context ctxt and
proves knowledge of a witness w such that the statement
statement(w) is true.
3. RELATED WORK & CURRENT TPM 2.0 SPECIFICATION
We now summarize the specification of current TPM 2.0
DAA interfaces and discuss its inherent security and privacy
issues and how existing work aims to overcome them.
TPM 2.0 Interface and SPKs. For realizing DAA, and
signature proofs of knowledge of a TPM secret key in gen-
eral, the TPM 2.0 specification offers four main commands
TPM.Create, TPM.Hash, TPM.Commit, and TPM.Sign. Calling
TPM.Create triggers the creation of a secret key tsk ∈ Zp and
a public key tpk ← g¯tsk , where g¯ and Zp are fixed parameters.
Roughly, for signing a message m via a signature proof of
knowledge (SPK) of tsk w.r.t. a basename bsnL, the host first
invokes TPM.Commit on input a group element g and basename
bsnL upon which the TPM outputs (commitId , E,K,L) with
K ← HG1(bsnL)tsk , and the t-values of the SPK, denoted
E ← gr and L ← HG1(bsnL)r. The TPM also internally
stores (commitId , r). The host then calls TPM.Hash to obtain
a hash c on the message (m, (E,L)). If the TPM wants to
sign this message, it marks c as safe to sign. The proof gets
completed by invoking the TPM.Sign command on input a
safe-to-sign hash c and a reference commitId to the random-
ness r upon which the TPM outputs s← r + c · tsk .
Due to this generic interface, the TPM 2.0 can be used to
construct multiple DAA schemes. Chen and Li [5] show that
the TPM 2.0 supports both LRSW-based DAA [23] and q-
SDH-based DAA [3], whereas the TPM 1.2 only supported
the original RSA-based DAA scheme [1]. Unfortunately, the
current TPM 2.0 interfaces have some drawbacks: the signa-
ture proofs of knowledge the TPM makes cannot be proven to
be unforgeable and there exists a static Diffie-Hellman oracle
leaking information about the TPM key.
3.1 Unforgeability Flaw for TPM 2.0-based SPKs
The SPKs that are created via the TPM commands should
be unforgeable, i.e., a host must not be able to compute an
SPK on message m without calling TPM.Sign on a hash
c that was previously cleared via a TPM.Hash call on m.
Chen and Li [5] aim to prove this property, but the proof
is incorrect, as pointed out by Xi et al. [8]. In the proof,
the authors simulate the TPM without knowing its secret key
tsk . To simulate an SPK on message m, the authors use the
standard approach of randomly choosing the c, s values, and
then derive the t-values E,L in TPM.Commit based on c, s,
and tpk . For the reduction to go through, one must ensure
that the randomly chosen c becomes the hash value of (m, t)
(via TPM.Hash and modeling the hash as random oracle), and
then let TPM.Sign respond with s whenever that c is given as
input. However, given that an adversary has arbitrary access to
the TPM interfaces, it can query TPM.Hash on many different
messages (m1, t), . . . , (mn, t) containing the same t value.
The reduction does not know which of these queries the
adversary will later use to complete the signature, and thus
only has a 1/n chance to correctly simulate the proof.
Unforgeability Fix Breaks Privacy. This problem is inherent
in the current TPM interface, but could be solved by a simple
modification to the TPM.Sign method as proposed by Xi et
al. [8]: when signing, the TPM first chooses a nonce nt and
computes c′ ← H(nt, c) and s ← r + c′ · tsk . This allows
to prove the unforgeability of TPM generated SPKs, as the
reduction can now program the random oracle on c′ only when
the TPM.Sign query is made.
However, this would also introduce a subliminal channel
for the TPM, as nt would be part of the final signature
and a subverted TPM can embed arbitrary information in
that nonce, breaking the anonymity without a host noticing.
Recent revelations of subverted cryptographic standards and
tampered hardware indicate that such attacks are very realistic.
We propose changes to the TPM that provably prevent such
subliminal challenges and at the same time allow to prove the
unforgeability of the SPKs, as we will show in Sec. 4.
3.2 Static Diffie-Hellman Oracle
Another problem in the TPM 2.0 interface is the static
Diffie-Hellman (DH) oracle, as pointed out by Acar et al. [25].
For any chosen point g ∈ G1, the host can learn gtsk by
calling (commitId , E,K,L) ← TPM.Commit(g, bsn), s ←
TPM.Sign(commitId , c) and computing gtsk ← (gs ·E−1)1/c.
This leaks a lot of information about tsk , Brown and Gal-
lant [26] and Cheon [27] show that the existence of such an
oracle makes finding the discrete log much easier. The reason
is that the oracle can be used to compute a q-SDH sequence
gtsk , gtsk
2
, . . . , gtsk
q for very large q, which in turn allows
to recover tsk faster than had one been given only g¯tsk . On
Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves [13], one third of the security
strength can be lost due to a static DH oracle. For example,
a 256 bit BN curve, which should offer 128 bits of security,
only offers 85 bits of security with a static DH oracle.
The static DH oracle also prevents forward anonymity.
Forward anonymity guarantees that signatures made by an
honest platform remain anonymous, even when the host later
becomes corrupted. In existing schemes, even anonymous
signatures contain a pair (gi, Ui,k) where gi is a random
generator and Ui,k = gtskki . With a static DH oracle, a host
upon becoming corrupt can use the TPM to compute U ′i = g
tsk
i
for all previous signatures, test whether U ′i = Ui,k, breaking
the anonymity of these signatures.
Cleared Generators for LRSW-based Schemes. Xi et al. [8]
propose an approach to remove the static DH oracle while
preserving the support for the both LRSW- and q-SDH-based
DAA schemes. They introduce a new TPM.Bind command that
takes as input two group elements P and K and a proof piP ←
SPK{α : P = g¯α ∧ K = tpkα}. The TPM verifies the proof
and, if correct, stores P as cleared generator. The TPM.Commit
interface will then only accept such cleared generators as input
for g. This removes the static DH oracle because the proof piP
shows that P tsk = K is already known. A similar approach
was also used in the recent LRSW-DAA scheme by Camenisch
et al. [9].
However, this approach has two crucial problems. First, it
is very hard to implement this functionality on a TPM. The
TPM stores only a small number of root keys due to the very
limited amount of storage available. For all other keys, the
TPM creates a “key blob” that contains the public part of the
key in the clear and the private part of the key encrypted with
one of the root keys. The TPM would have to similarly store
an authenticated list of generators which have been cleared via
the TPM.Bind interface. However, this would be a new type
of key structure, which is a significant change to the current
TPM 2.0 specification.
Second, this interface does not support signature-based
revocation, which is an important extension to anonymous sig-
natures. This type of revocation was introduced in EPID [28]
and allows one to revoke a platform given a signature from
that platform. Roughly, for signature-based revocation, every
signature includes a pair (B, nym) where B ←$ G1 and
nym← Btsk . The signature revocation list SRL contains tuples
{(Bi, nymi)} from signatures of the platforms that are revoked.
When signing, the TPM must also prove that it is not the
producer of any of these revoked signatures. To do so, it proves
piSRL,i ← SPK∗{(tsk) : nym = Btsk ∧ nymi 6= Btski } for each
tuple in SRL. Using the changes proposed by Xi et al. [8], a
host cannot input the generators Bi to the TPM anymore as
it is not able to produce proofs piBi that are required in the
TPM.Bind interface.
Random Generators via Hashing. Another approach to
remove the static DH oracle is to determine the base g by
hashing. That is, instead of inputing g in TPM.Commit, the
host provides a basename bsnE upon which the TPM derives
g ← HG1(bsnE). By assuming that the hash function is a
random oracle, g is now enforced to be a random instead of
a chosen generator which avoids the static DH oracle, as the
host can no longer create the large q-SDH sequences that are
the basis of the static DH attacks.
Interestingly, this approach was included in the revision
from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0 to avoid another static DH oracle
that was present in the earlier standard. In TPM 1.2, the
TPM.Commit interface received a generator j instead of bsnL
and directly computed K ← jtsk and L ← jr, whereas
TPM 2.0 now receives bsnL and first derives j ← HG1(bsnL).
While applying the same idea on g would solve the prob-
lem, it would also significantly limit the functionality of the
TPM interface. Recall that TPM 2.0 was designed to support
both, LRSW- and q-SDH-based DAA schemes. While q-SDH
schemes could be easily ported to these new interfaces, no
current LRSW-based scheme would be supported. All existing
LRSW-based schemes require the TPM to prove knowledge of
d = btsk for a generator b← ay chosen by the DAA issuer. As
the issuer must be privy of the discrete logarithm y, it cannot
produce a basename bsnE such that b = HG1(bsnE) holds at
the same time.
Another protocol that would, in its current forms, not be
compatible with this change is the aforementioned signature-
based revocation [28], which needs the TPM to use basenames
Bi defined in the revocation list SRL. Camenisch et al. [10]
recently proposed to use B ← HG1(bsn) instead of B ←$ G1
to avoid the DH oracle, i.e., the TPM gets bsn as input and
the SRL has the form {(bsni, nymi)}. However, the authors
did not detail how the TPM interfaces have to be changed
to support this approach. In fact, their protocol is not easily
instantiable, as their proposed computations by the TPM for
generating the proofs piSRL,i would require the TPM to keep
state, which in turn would require new TPM commands.
Our Approach. In this work we follow the idea of using
hash-based generators but thoroughly describe the necessary
changes to the TPM 2.0 specification and, in addition, are
very conscious to optimize our solutions. Most importantly,
our proposed modifications do not require any new TPM
commands, but modify the existing ones only slightly. To
demonstrate the flexibility of our TPM interface we present a
generic protocol that allows to create a wide class of signature
proofs of knowledge using these TPM commands. The existing
LRSW-based DAA and signature-based revocation protocols
cannot be used with our interface due to the aforementioned
issues. We therefore also propose new protocols for signature-
based revocation and LRSW-based DAA that are compatible
with the proposed TPM interfaces and provably secure.
4. THE REVISED TPM 2.0 INTERFACE
This section introduces new TPM 2.0 interfaces for creating
signature proofs of knowledge. The TPM creates keys with
the TPM.Create command. Messages can be signed by first
calling TPM.Commit, followed by a TPM.Hash and a TPM.Sign
command. We first discuss our proposed modifications to these
commands and how they address the problems mentioned
in Sec. 3. Indeed, we are able to do that by making only
minor modifications to the commands. The description of our
revised TPM interfaces is presented in Fig. 1. We again use a
simplified notation and refer for the full specification of our
TPM 2.0 interfaces to the full version of this paper.
Avoiding a Subliminal Channel. To solve the unforgeability
problem discussed in Sec. 3, a nonce to which the TPM
contributed needs to be included in the computation of the
Fiat-Shamir challenge c′. Thereby, a malicious TPM must not
be able to alter the distribution of the signature proofs of
knowledge, as this would break the privacy, which is the key
goal of anonymous attestation. For this reason, the nonce needs
to be computed jointly at random by the TPM and the host. In
TPM.Commit, the TPM chooses a nonce nt and commits to that
nonce by computing n¯t ← H(“nonce”,nt). The host picks
another nonce nh, and gives that as input to TPM.Sign. The
TPM must use nt⊕nh in the Fiat-Shamir hash. An honest host
takes nh uniformly at random, which guarantees that nt ⊕ nh
is uniform random, preventing a malicious TPM from hiding
messages in the nonce.
Avoiding the DH Oracle. The TPM.Commit command is
changed to prevent a static Diffie-Hellman oracle. The oracle
exists in the current TPM 2.0 interface because therein a host
can pass any value g to the TPM and obtain gtsk . Our revised
TPM prevents this as it will only use a generator g˜ that is
either g˜ ← HG1(bsnE) for some bsnE it receives, or set to
g˜ ← g¯ if bsnE = ⊥ where g¯ denotes the fixed generator used
within the TPMs.
Clearly, the host can no longer abuse this interface to learn
information about the TPM secret key tsk . If g˜ = g¯, the
host receives tpk which it already knows. If g˜ = HG1(bsnE)
and we model the hash function as a random oracle, the host
receives a random element raised to power tsk , which does not
give the host useful information. More precisely, the proof of
Lemma 2 shows that we can simulate a TPM without knowing
tsk , which proves that the TPM does not leak information
on tsk . Although our changes limit the generators that the
host can choose, Sec. 5.2 shows that we can still build DAA
schemes based on q-SDH and LRSW on top of this interface,
including support for signature-based revocation.
4.1 Zero-knowledge Proofs with the TPM
We now describe how our proposed TPM interfaces can be
used to create a wide class of signature proofs of knowledge.
To demonstrate the flexibility of our interface we propose a
generic proof protocol Prove that orchestrates the underlying
TPM commands. We then show that proofs generated by Prove
are unforgeable, device-bound and remain zero-knowledge
even if the TPM is subverted. Thus, protocol designers can
use our Prove protocol as generic building block for more
complex protocols instead of having to use the TPM command
and proving these security properties from scratch. Our DAA
protocols presented in Sec. 5 use exactly that approach.
A Generic Prove Protocol. Using the proposed TPM inter-
faces, a host can create signature proofs of knowledge of the
following structure:
SPK∗{(γ · (tsk + hsk), α1, . . . , αl) :
y1 = (gˆ
δ)γ·(tsk+hsk) ·
∏
i
bi
αi ∧
y2 = HG1(bsnL)
γ·(tsk+hsk) ·
∏
i
b′i
αi ∧
y3 =
∏
i
b′′i
αi}(mh,mt) , (1)
for values δ, hsk , tsk , and γ in Zp, strings bsnL,mh,mt ∈
{0, 1}∗, group elements y1, y2, y3, gˆ, and set {(αi, bi, b′i, b′′i )}i,
with αi ∈ Zp. Either y1, gˆ, and all bi’s are in G1 or they are
all in GT . All b′i values and y2 must be in G1. If bsnL = ⊥,
the second equation proving a representation of y2 is omitted
from the proof. We could also lift this part of the proof to GT
but as we do not require such proofs, we omit this to simplify
the presentation. The values y3 and b′′i must either all be in
G1, in G2, or in GT .
In addition we require that the TPM works with a cleared
generator, meaning either gˆ = g˜ or gˆ = e(g˜, gˆ2) with g˜
denoting the cleared generator being either g¯, i.e., the fixed
generator or it is HG1(bsnE) for some bsnE .
Session system parameters: G1 = 〈g¯〉 of prime order q, nonce bit
length ln, random oracles H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and HG1 : {0, 1}∗ →
G1. Initialize Committed← ∅ and commitId ← 0.
Init. On input TPM.Create():
• If this is the first invocation of TPM.Create, choose a fresh
secret key tsk ←$ Zp and compute public key tpk ← g¯tsk .
• Store tsk and output tpk .
Hash. On input TPM.Hash(mt,mh):
• If mt 6= ⊥, the TPM checks whether it wants to attest to mt.
• Compute c← H(“TPM ”,mt,mh).
• Mark c as “safe to sign” and output c.
Commit. On input TPM.Commit(bsnE , bsnL):
• If bsnE 6= ⊥, set g˜ ← HG1(bsnE), otherwise set g˜ ← g¯.
• Choose r ←$ Zp, nt ←$ {0, 1}ln and store (commitId , r,nt) in
Committed.
• Set n¯t ← H(“nonce”,nt), E ← g˜r, and K,L← ⊥.
• If bsnL 6= ⊥, set j ← HG1(bsnL), K ← jtsk and L← jr.
• Output (commitId , n¯t, E,K,L) and increment commitId .
Sign. On input TPM.Sign(commitId , c,nh):
• Retrieve record (commitId , r,nt) and remove it from
Committed, output an error if no such record was found.
• If c is safe to sign, set c′ ← H(“FS”,nt ⊕ nh, c) and
s← r + c′ · tsk and output (nt, s).
Fig. 1. Our proposed modified TPM 2.0 interface (changes w.r.t. the current specification are highlighted in blue).
Variable Type Explanation
TPM: tsk Zp secret key held inside the TPM (in DAA part of the platform secret key)
tpk G1 public key corresponding to tsk , i.e., tpk = g¯tsk
g¯ G1 fixed generator in all TPMs
g˜ G1 cleared generator created in TPM.Commit, with g˜ ← HG1(bsnE) if bsnE 6= ⊥ and g˜ ← g¯ else
Prove: hsk Zp secret key held by the host (in DAA part of the platform secret key), set hsk = 1 if not needed
y1 G1 or GT see SPK (1), if y1 ∈ GT then gˆ2 is a mandatory input
bsnE {0, 1}∗ or ⊥ basename for generator g˜ ← HG1(bsnE), if bsnE = ⊥ then g˜ ← g¯
δ Zp see SPK (1), set δ = 1 if not needed
gˆ2 G2 if y1 ∈ GT , or ⊥ if gˆ2 6= ⊥, it moves proof to GT by setting gˆ ← e(g˜, gˆ2); if gˆ2 = ⊥ then gˆ ← g˜
γ Zp see SPK (1), set γ = 1 if not needed
bsnL {0, 1}∗ or ⊥ basename for generator j ← HG1(bsnL) if bsnL 6= ⊥
y3 G1, G2, GT , or ⊥ see SPK (1), set y3 = ⊥ if not needed
αi Zp see SPK (1), input given as part of {(αi, bi, b′i, b′′i )}i
bi same group as y1 see SPK (1), set bi = 1G if αi is not needed in the first equation of (1)
b′i G1 see SPK (1), set b′i = 1G1 if αi is not needed in the second equation (1)
b′′i same group as y3 see SPK (1), set b
′′
i = 1G if αi is not needed in the third equation (1)
mh {0, 1}∗ or ⊥ message that the host adds to an attestation
mt {0, 1}∗ or ⊥ message the TPM attests to
Fig. 2. Overview of variables used within the TPM and in our Prove protocol.
The protocol allows the host to add a key hsk to the witness
for tsk because, as we will see in the later sections, this can
improve the privacy of DAA schemes. Note that we could
trivially generalize the proof statement (1) to include additional
terms that do not contain γ · (tsk + hsk) as witness, but for
ease of presentation we omit these additional terms.
The host can add any message mh to the proof. It also
chooses mt, but this is a value the TPM attests to and will be
checked by the TPM.
The host can create such a proof using the Prove protocol
described in Fig. 3. We assume a perfectly secure channel
between the host and TPM, i.e., the adversary does not notice
the host calling TPM commands. Note that before starting the
proof, the host may not know y2, as it does not know tsk ,
but learns this value during the proof because it is given as
output of the Prove protocol. How to verify such proofs using
the VerSPK algorithm is shown in Fig. 3 as well. Note that
verification does not require any participation of the TPM.
Fig. 2 gives a brief overview of the required parameters and
their respective types and conditions.
The completeness of these proofs can easily be verified.
The proof is sound as we can extract a valid witness using the
standard rewinding technique.
Example for Using Prove. We now give a simple example to
show how the Prove protocol must be invoked and give some
intuition on how the final proof is assembled by our protocol.
Suppose we want to prove:
SPK∗{(tsk + hsk) : d′ = (HG1(bsnE)δ)(tsk+hsk) ∧
nym = HG1(bsnL)
(tsk+hsk)}(mh,mt),
where the TPM holds tsk and the host knows hsk . The host
will add hsk to the witness for tsk , which is the first input to
Prove. The second argument is the left hand side of the first
equation, which is d′. The generator for the witness tsk +hsk
is (HG1(bsnE)
δ), which is passed on to the Prove protocol by
giving bsnE and δ as the next arguments. The protocol has
the option to move the proof to GT by passing a value gˆ2,
but as this proof takes place in G1, we enter gˆ2 = ⊥. We can
prove knowledge of γ · (tsk + hsk), but as we want to use
witness tsk + hsk , we pass γ = 1. In the second equation,
we use HG1(bsnL) as generator, so we give argument bsnL.
Prove(hsk , y1, bsnE , δ, gˆ2, γ, bsnL, y3,
{(αi, bi, b′i, b′′i )}i,mh,mt) :
• If bsnE 6= ⊥, set g˜ ← HG1(bsnE), otherwise set g˜ ← g¯.
• If gˆ2 6= ⊥, set gˆ ← e(g˜, gˆ2), otherwise set gˆ ← g˜.
• If bsnL 6= ⊥, set j ← HG1(bsnL).
• Call TPM.Commit(bsnE , bsnL)→ (commitId , n¯t, E,K,L).
• Take rhsk ←$ Zp, set E′ ← (E · g˜rhsk )γ·δ . If bsnL 6= ⊥, set
K ′ ← (K · jhsk )γ and L′ ← (L · jrhsk )γ .
• If bsnL 6= ⊥, set y2 ← K ′ ·
∏
i b
′
i
αi .
• Take {rαi}li=1 ←$ Zlp. Set t1 ← E′ ·
∏
i b
rαi
i if bi ∈ G1, or
t1 ← e(E′, gˆ2) ·
∏
i b
rαi
i if bi ∈ GT .
• If bsnL 6= ⊥, set t2 ← L′
∏
i b
′
i
rαi and t2 ← ⊥ else.
• If y3 6= ⊥, set t3 ←
∏
i b
′′
i
rαi and t3 ← ⊥ else.
• Set m′h ← (mh, y1, gˆδ, {(bi, b′i, b′′i )}, t1, y2, bsnL, t2, y3, t3).
• Call TPM.Hash(mt,m′h)→ c.
• Take nh ←$ {0, 1}ln .
• Call TPM.Sign(commitId , c,nh)→ (nt, s).
• Check that n¯t = H(“nonce”, nt) and set n ← nh ⊕ nt,
c′ ← H(“FS”, n, c).
• Set s′ ← γ · (s+ rhsk + c′ · hsk) and sαi ← rαi + c′ · αi for
i = 1, . . . , l.
• Check (gˆδ)s
′
= E′ · (y1/(
∏
i b
αi
i )
c′ and if bsnE 6= ⊥, check
js
′
= L′ ·K ′c′ .
• Set proof pi ← (c′,n, s′, {sαi}) and output (y2, pi).
VerSPK(pi, y1, gˆ
δ, y2, bsnL, y3, {(αi, bi, b′i, b′′i )}i,mh,mt) :
• Parse pi as (c′,n, s′, {sαi}).
• Set t1 ← y−c
′
1 · (gˆδ)s
′ ·∏i bisαi .
• If bsnL 6= ⊥, set t2 ← y−c
′
2 · HG1(bsnL)s
′ ·∏i b′isαi , and
t2 ← ⊥ else.
• If y3 6= ⊥, set t3 ← y−c
′
3 ·
∏
i b
′′
i
sαi and t3 ← ⊥ else.
• Output 1 if c′ = H(“FS”,n,H(“TPM ”,mt, (mh, y1, gˆδ,
{(bi, b′i, b′′i )}, t1, y2, bsnL, t2, y3, t3))), and 0 otherwise.
Fig. 3. Prove protocol and VerSPK algorithm to create and verify zero-
knowledge proofs via the TPM interfaces from Fig. 1.
Since our proof omits the third equation, we set y3 ← ⊥.
The protocol supports an additional list of witnesses with
generators in the three equations, but since this equation only
uses witness tsk+hsk , we pass an empty list as next argument.
Finally, we specify mt, the message the TPM attests to, and
mh, the additional data added by the host. Therefore, we call
Prove(hsk , d′, bsnE , δ,⊥, 1, bsnL,⊥, ∅,mh,mt).
The protocol calls TPM.Commit with basenames bsnE and
bsnL to receive E = HG1(bsnE)
rtsk and L = HG1(bsnL)
rtsk
for some rtsk , and K = HG1(bsnL)
tsk , along with n¯t =
H(“nonce”, nt), that commits the TPM to TPM nonce nt. The
host must change the generator for the first proof equation
to HG1(bsnL)
δ instead of HG1(bsnL), and add randomness
to both values to prevent a malicious TPM from altering
the distribution of the resulting proof. It sets t1 ← Eδ ·
(HG1(bsnE)
δ)rhsk = (HG1(bsnE)
δ)rtsk+rtsk , and t2 ← L ·
HG1(bsnL)
rhsk = HG1(bsnE)
rtsk+rtsk . Next, it hashes the t-
values along with the proof parameters and messages mt and
mh using TPM.Hash. The TPM inspects mt and returns c,
which can only be passed to TPM.Sign if the TPM agrees to
signing mt. The host now calls TPM.Sign with c and a fresh
host nonce nh, upon which it receives nt and s = rtsk +c′ ·tsk .
The host checks whether nt matches the committed TPM
nonce, and computes the joint nonce n ← nh ⊕ nt and Fiat-
Shamir challenge c′ ← H(“FS”, n, c). The host must now add
its randomness and hsk to the s-value, which it does by setting
s′ ← s+rhsk +c′ ·hsk . Finally, it checks whether the resulting
proof is valid, to make sure that the TPM contributions did
not invalidate the proof. The resulting proof consists of nonce
n , Fiat-Shamir challenge c′, and s-value s′.
4.1.1 Security of Prove
We now show that proofs generated by our generic Prove
protocol specified in Fig. 3 and using the TPM interfaces as
described in Fig. 1 are unforgeable, device-bound and remain
zero-knowledge even if the TPM is subverted.
Zero-knowledge of SPKs with a Corrupt TPM. An SPK
created with the Prove protocol is zero knowledge in the
random oracle model, even when the TPM is corrupt. That
is, we prove the absence of any subliminal channel that a
malicious TPM could use to break the privacy of the platform.
In Sec. 5 we show that this allows one to devise DAA schemes
that guarantee privacy even when the TPM is malicious.
Lemma 1 (Privacy of SPKs with a TPM). The signature
proofs of knowledge generated by Prove as defined in Fig. 1,
are zero-knowledge, even when the TPM is corrupt.
Proof (sketch). A corrupt TPM may block the creation of the
proof, but if it succeeds, it is zero knowledge. The TPM is
involved in proving knowledge of γ · (tsk + hsk). The host
changes the r-value to γ · (rtsk + rhsk ), with rhsk chosen by
the host. It takes rhsk ←$ Zp, so rtsk + rhsk is uniform in
Zp regardless of how the TPM chooses rtsk . Since γ 6= 0,
γ · (rtsk + rhsk ) is still uniform in Zp.
The TPM also chooses a nonce nt. It must first commit to
this nonce with n¯t = H(“nonce”,nt). The host then chooses
a nonce nh uniformly at random in {0, 1}ln , and the TPM
must work with n = nh ⊕ nt, and show that it computed this
correctly. Clearly, n is uniform if nh is uniform.
Since we know the distribution of every part of the zero-
knowledge proof, even when the TPM is corrupt, we can
simulate proofs of an honest host with a corrupt TPM.
Unforgeability of SPKs with an Honest TPM. We now show
that proofs generated by Prove are unforgeable with respect
to mt, i.e., if the TPM is honest, a corrupt host cannot create
a SPK for message mt that the TPM did not approve to sign.
We consider a corrupt host with oracle access to an honest
TPM. The TPM executes TPM.Create, outputting tpk ← g¯tsk .
The corrupt host cannot create SPKs of structure (1) where tsk
is protected by the TPM and γ and hsk are known and the
TPM never signed mt. We require the host to output γ and
hsk along with his forgery. In a protocol, this means that these
values must be fixed (e.g., γ always equals 1) or extractable
from some proof of knowledge for this lemma to be applicable.
Lemma 2 (Unforgeability of SPKs with a TPM). The sig-
nature proofs of knowledge generated by Prove as defined
in Fig. 1, are unforgeable w.r.t. mt. More precisely, the host
cannot forge a signature proof of knowledge with the structure
of (1) with a witness γ · (tsk + hsk) for known γ, hsk if the
TPM never signed mt, under the DL assumption in the random
oracle model.
Proof (sketch). We show that if an adversary A that has access
to the TPM interfaces can forge SPK’s, we can derive an
adversary B that can solve the discrete logarithm problem.
Note that it is crucial that we allow the adversary A to get
full, unconstrained access to the TPM interfaces instead of
giving him only indirect access via the Prove protocol, as this
correctly models the power a corrupt host will have.
Our reduction B receives a DL instance tpk = g¯tsk and is
challenged to find tsk . To do so, we simulate the TPM and
the hash function towards A based on tpk , g¯ as follows:
Hash queries: For queries bsni to HG1 , take ri ←$ Zp and
return HG1(bsni) = g¯
ri and store (hash,HG1(bsni), ri).
Queries to H and TPM.Hash are handled normally.
Commit query TPM.Commit(bsnE , bsnL): Take (si, c′i) ←$
Z2p. If bsnE 6= ⊥, compute HG1(bsnE), look up
the record (hash,HG1(bsnE), rE), and set E ← g¯s ·
tpk−c
′
i·rE . If bsnE = ⊥, set E ← g¯s · tpk−c
′
i .
If bsnL 6= ⊥, compute HG1(bsnL), look up the
record (hash,HG1(bsnL), rL), and set K ← tpkrL =
HG1(bsnL)
tsk , and L← g¯s · tpk−c′i·rL . If bsnL = ⊥, set
K ← ⊥ and L← ⊥.
Pick n¯t uniform in the range of H, store
(commitId , n¯t, si, c
′
i), increment commitId , and
output (commitId , n¯t, E,K,L).
Sign query TPM.Sign(commitId , c,nh): Look up and re-
move record (commitId , n¯t, si, c′i), and output an error
if no such record was found. Check that c was marked
safe-to-sign in a TPM.Hash query. Pick nt ←$ {0, 1}ln and
program the random oracle such that H(“nonce”,nt) =
n¯t. Program the random oracle such that H(“FS”,nt ⊕
nh, c) = c
′
i. Since the nonce nt is fresh and gets only used
once, the probability that the random oracle is already
defined on that input is negligible. Finally, we output
(nt, si).
When A, after having interacted with these oracles, outputs
a SPK forgery, i.e., a valid proof with TPM message mt that
the TPM never agreed to sign in TPM.Hash, along with values
γ, hsk such that the proof uses γ · (tsk + hsk) as witness,
we either have a collision in H which occurs with negligible
probability, or we can rewind to extract γ ·(tsk+hsk), allowing
us to compute tsk . B then outputs tsk , solving the DL problem.
Device Boundedness of SPKs with an Honest TPM. Finally,
we show that proofs generated via Prove are device bound,
i.e., the host cannot create more SPKs than the amount of
sign queries the TPM answered. Again, the TPM holds tsk
with tpk = g¯tsk created by TPM.Create.
Lemma 3 (Device Boundedness of SPKs with a TPM). The
signature proofs of knowledge generated by Prove as defined
in Fig. 1, are device bound. That is, the host cannot create
more signature proofs of knowledge with the structure of (1)
with a witnesses γ · (tsk + hsk), where tsk is protected by the
TPM and the host knows γ and hsk , than the amount of sign
queries the TPM answered, under the DL assumption in the
random oracle model.
Proof (sketch). Our reduction receives a DL instance tpk =
g¯tsk and must compute tsk . The simulation works exactly as
in the proof of Lemma 2. If the host made n sign queries and
outputs n+ 1 SPKs and corresponding values γ and hsk , we
look at every c′ value of the proofs. If there are two distinct
SPKs with the same c′ value, there must be a collision in H,
which occurs with negligible probability. If all c′ values are
distinct, one of them must be different from the c′ values as
created by the TPM. That means the random oracle is not
programmed here and we can rewind that proof to extract
γ ·(tsk +hsk). Since we also have hsk and γ we can compute
tsk , which solves the DL problem.
4.1.2 Proofs Without TPM Contribution
To be able to prove security of our DAA schemes, we must
distinguish proofs to which the TPM contributed and proofs
that the host created by itself. One way to achieve this is by
using different prefixes in the Fiat-Shamir hash computation.
Proofs with TPM contribution have a Fiat-Shamir hash c′ ←
H(“FS”,n,H(“TPM ”,mt,mh)). Proofs without TPM con-
tribution will use c′ ← H(“FS”,n,H(“NoTPM ”,mt,mh)).
We denote TPM contributed proofs by SPK∗, and proofs
without TPM contribution SPK.
5. PROVABLY SECURE DAA SCHEMES
We now show how to use the proposed TPM interfaces to
build provably secure direct anonymous attestation protocols.
We start by describing the desired functional and security
properties (Sec. 5.1) and then present two DAA protocols,
based on the q-SDH assumption and the LRSW assumption
(Sec. 5.2), and argue their security (Sec. 5.3). We refer to
Appendix A for the formal definition of DAA in the form of
an ideal functionality and to the full version of this paper for
the detailed security proof.
5.1 Definition & Security Model
In a DAA scheme, we have four main entities: a number
of TPMs, a number of hosts, an issuer, and a number of
verifiers. The scheme comprises a JOIN and SIGN protocol,
and VERIFY and LINK algorithms.
JOIN: A TPM and a host together form a platform which
performs the join protocol with the issuer who decides if the
platform is allowed to become a member. The membership
credential of the platform then also certifies a number of
attributes attrs = (a1, . . . , aL) given by the issuer. These
attributes might include more information about the platform,
such as the vendor or model, or other information, such as an
expiration date of the credential.
SIGN: Once being a member, the TPM and host together can
sign messages m with respect to basename bsn resulting in
a signature σ. If a platform signs with a fresh basename,
the signature must be anonymous and unlinkable to previous
signatures. When signing, the platform can also selectively
disclose attributes from its membership credential. For in-
stance, reveal that the signature was created by a TPM of
a certain manufacturer, or the expiration date of the creden-
tial. We describe the disclosure using a tuple (D, I) where
D ⊆ {1, . . . , L} indicates which attributes are disclosed, and
I = (a1, . . . , aL) specifies the desired attribute values.
VERIFY: Any verifier can check that a signature σ on message
m stems from a legitimate platform via a deterministic verify
algorithm. More precisely, verification gets as input a tuple
(m, bsn, σ, (D, I),RL,SRL) and outputs 1 if σ is a valid
signatures on message m w.r.t. basename bsn and stems from
a platform that has a membership credential satisfying the
predicate defined via (D, I), and 0 otherwise.
The inputs RL and SRL are revocation lists and we support
two types of revocation, private-key-based revocation and
signature-based revocation. The first is based on the exposure
of a corrupt platform’s secret key (or private key) and allows
one to recognize and thus reject all signatures generated with
this key. That is, the revocation list RL contains the secret
keys of the revoked TPMs. The second type, signature-based
revocation, has been proposed by Brickell and Li [28], [29]
in their Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) protocol. It allows one
to revoke a platform based on a previous signature from
that platform, i.e., here the revocation list SRL contains the
signatures of the revoked TPMs.
LINK: By default, signatures created by an DAA scheme do
not leak any information about the identity of the signer. Only
when the platform signs repeatedly with the same basename
bsn , it will be clear that the resulting signatures were created
by the same platform, which can be publicly tested via the
deterministic LINK algorithm. More precisely, on input two
signatures (σ,m, (D, I),SRL), (σ′,m′, (D′, I ′),SRL′), and a
basename bsn , the algorithm outputs 1 if both signatures are
valid and were created by the same platform, and 0 otherwise.
We now describe the desired security properties of DAA
schemes in an informal manner. The detailed definition in
form of an ideal functionality in the Universal Composability
framework [30] is given in Appendix A, and closely follows
the recent formal models of Camenisch et al. [9], [24].
Unforgeability. The adversary can only sign in the name of
corrupt TPMs. More precisely, if n corrupt and unrevoked
TPMs joined with attributes fulfilling attribute disclosure
(D, I), the adversary can create at most n unlinkable sig-
natures for the same basename bsn and attribute disclosure
(D, I). In particular, this means that when the issuer and all
unrevoked TPMs are honest, no adversary can create a valid
signature on a message m w.r.t. basename bsn and attribute
disclosure (D, I) when no platform that joined with those
attributes signed m w.r.t. bsn and (D, I).
Non-Frameability. No adversary can create a signature on a
message m w.r.t. basename bsn that links to a signature created
by an honest platform, when this honest platform never signed
m w.r.t. bsn . We require this property to hold even when the
issuer is corrupt.
(Strong) Privacy. An adversary that is given two signatures
σ1 and σ2 w.r.t. two different basenames bsn1 6= bsn2,
respectively, cannot distinguish whether both signatures were
created by one honest platform, or whether two different
honest platforms created the signatures. This property must
also hold when the issuer is corrupt.
So far, privacy was conditioned on the honesty of the entire
platform, i.e., both the TPM and the host have to be honest.
In fact, the previous DAA schemes crucially rely on the
honesty of the TPM, and the newly revised TPM interfaces
even introduced a subliminal channel that allows a malicious
TPM to always encode some identifying information into his
signature contribution (see Sec. 3.1). The latter forestalls any
privacy in the presence of a corrupt TPM, even if the DAA
protocol built on top of the TPM interfaces would allow for
better privacy.
In this work we have proposed TPM interfaces that
avoid such subliminal channels and we consequently aim
for stronger privacy guarantees for DAA as well. That is,
the aforementioned indistinguishability of two signatures σ1
and σ2 must hold whenever the host is honest, regardless
of the corruption state of the TPM. Our notion of strong
privacy lies between the classical privacy notion (relying also
on the honesty of the TPM) and optimal privacy that was
recently introduced by Camenisch et al. [24]. We discuss the
differences between these notions, and to [24] in particular, in
Appendix A.
5.2 DAA Protocols
We start by presenting the high-level idea of both DAA
protocols using our revised TPM 2.0 interfaces, and then
describe the concrete instantiations based on the q-SDH and
the LRSW assumption.
Both protocols roughly follow the common structure of
previous DAA protocols: the platform, consisting of a TPM
and a host, generates a secret key gsk that gets blindly certified
by a trusted issuer in a membership credential cred . When
attributes attrs = a1, . . . aL are used, the credential also
certifies attrs . After that join procedure, the platform can use
the key gsk to sign attestations and basenames and prove that
it has a valid credential on the underlying key, which certifies
the trusted origin of the attestation. The overview of the DAA
protocol is depicted in Fig. 4.
JOIN : TPM 
 HOST(ipk) 
 ISSUER(isk , attrs = (a1, . . . , aL))
-JOIN
n ←$ {0, 1}τﬀ nRequest TPM keyﬀTPM.Createtsk ←$ Zp, tpk ← g¯tsk
Store tsk -tpk Orchestrate generation of proof pitpk by
the TPM using the Prove protocol
ﬀTPM.Commit/TPM.Sign,n
tpk ′ ← g˜tsk (optional bridging to a different generator g˜)
pitpk ← SPK∗{tsk : tpk = g¯tsk ∧ tpk ′ = g˜tsk}(“join”,n)
-tpk
′, pitpk Choose host key and generate gpk :
hsk ←$ Zp, gpk ← tpk ′ · g˜hsk
pigpk ← SPK{hsk : gpk/tpk ′ = g˜hsk}(“join”,n)
-tpk , tpk
′, gpk , pitpk , pigpk
Verify pitpk , pigpk , and sign gpk together
with attributes attrs = (a1, . . . , aL):
cred ← PBSign(isk , (gpk , attrs))
ﬀcred , attrsVerify cred w.r.t. gpk , attrs, ipk
Store (hsk , cred , attrs)
SIGN : TPM(tsk)
 HOST((hsk , cred , attrs),
(ipk ,m, bsn, (D, I),RL,SRL))
• The host verifies that its attributes attrs fulfill the predi-
cate (D, I), i.e., it parses I as (a′1, . . . , a
′
L) and attrs as
(a1, . . . , aL) and checks that ai = a′i for every i ∈ D.
• The host and TPM jointly generate the pseudonym
nym ← HG(1||bsn)gsk and proof picred of a membership
credential on gsk = tsk + hsk and attrs:
picred ← NIZK∗{(gsk , cred) : nym = HG1(1||bsn)gsk ∧
1 = PBVf(ipk , cred ′, gsk , attrs)}(“sign”, (D, I),m,SRL)
• For each tuple (bsni, nymi) ∈ SRL, the host and TPM
jointly create non-revocation proofs piSRL,i:
piSRL,i ← SPK∗{gsk : HG1(1||bsni)gsk 6= nymi ∧
nym = HG1(1||bsn)gsk}(“sign”).
• The host outputs σ ← (nym, picred , {piSRL,i}).
VERIFY(ipk , σ,m, bsn, (D, I),RL,SRL) :
• Parse σ = (nym, picred , {piSRL,i}).
• Verify picred , {piSRL,i} w.r.t. ipk ,m, bsn, (D, I),SRL.
• For every gsk i ∈ RL, check that HG1(1||bsn)gski 6= nym.
• Output 1 if all proofs are correct, and 0 otherwise.
LINK(ipk , bsn, (σ,m, (D, I),SRL), (σ′,m′, (D′, I ′),SRL′)) :
• Get f ← VERIFY(ipk , σ,m, bsn, (D, I),RL,SRL),
and f ′ ← VERIFY(ipk , σ′,m′, bsn, (D′, I ′),RL′,SRL′),
with RL = RL′ = ∅.
• Continue if f = f ′ = 1, else abort with output ⊥.
• Parse σ = (nym, picred , {piSRL,i}), σ′ = (nym′, pi′cred , {pi′SRL,i}).
• If nym = nym′, output 1, and 0 otherwise.
Fig. 4. High-level overview of the DAA protocols.
Split-Keys for Strong Privacy. In contrast to existing
schemes, we do not set gsk = tsk because solely relying
on the secret key tsk of the TPM would not allow for the
strong privacy property we are aiming for. Instead, we partially
follow the approach of Camenisch et al. [24] and let the host
contribute to the platform’s secret key. That is, we split the
key as gsk = tsk + hsk , where hsk is the contribution of
the host to the platform secret key. As in previous work, the
platform secret key gsk gets blindly signed by the issuer using
a partially blind signature PBSign that certifies the secret key
by signing the platform’s public key gpk = g˜gsk .
Note that to allow for algorithmic agility, we derive the plat-
form’s key from a generator g˜, which can either be a cleared
generator created with TPM.Commit as g˜ ← HG1(0||str) for
some string str, or g˜ ← g¯, i.e. being the standard generator
fixed in all TPMs. When using a cleared generator, the input to
the hash function will be prepended with a 0-bit to ensure that
the same generator will not be used in a signature (where we
will prepend a 1-bit when creating generators), as this would
break the unlinkability between joining and signing otherwise.
We now have to ensure that gsk is derived from a key tsk
held inside a real TPM. To this end, the TPM first has to prove
in pitpk that its contribution tpk ′ = g˜tsk is based on the same
secret key tsk as the actual TPM public key tpk = g¯tsk . The
host then forwards tpk , tpk ′ and pitpk along with a proof pigpk
that it correctly derived gpk from the TPM’s contribution tpk ′
to the issuer.
Each TPM is equipped by the manufacturer with an endorse-
ment key. This key allows the issuer to verify the authenticity
of the TPM provided values in the JOIN protocol. As this
is the standard procedure in all DAA protocols, we omit the
details how this authentication is done and implicitly assume
that the value tpk in the JOIN protocol is authenticated with
the endorsement key.
After having obtained a membership credential on the joint
secret key gsk (and possibly a set of attributes attrs), the
attestation signatures are then computed jointly by the host
and TPM.
Signature-Based Revocation. We also want to support
signature-based revocation introduced in the EPID protocol
by Brickell and Li [28], [29] as it allows one to revoke
TPMs without assuming that a secret key held inside the TPM
becomes publicly available upon corruption, which improves
the standard private-key-based revocation in DAA.
Roughly, for signature-based revocation, a platform would
extend its signatures by additional values (B, nym) where B
is a random generator for G1 and nym ← Bgsk . The sig-
nature revocation list SRL contains tuples {(Bi, nymi)} from
signatures of the platforms that are revoked. Thus, a platform
must also show that it is not among that list by proving
piSRL,i ← SPK∗{(gsk) : nym = Bgsk ∧ nymi 6= Bgski }.
Any TPM interface that supports such proofs would raise Bi
to the secret key and inevitably provide a static DH oracle.
Camenisch et al. [10] recently addressed this issue and
proposed a q-SDH-based DAA scheme with signature-based
revocation that avoids this issue. Instead of giving the gener-
ator as direct input, it uses Bi ← HG1(1||bsni) computed by
the TPM, i.e., the TPM gets 1||bsni as input and the SRL has
the form {(1||bsni, nymi)}. For every (1||bsni, nymi) ∈ SRL,
the platform shows that HG1(1||bsni)gsk 6= nymi by taking a
random γ, setting Ci = (HG1(1||bsni)/nymi)γ , and proving
pi′SRL,i ← SPK∗{(γ · gsk , γ) :
1 = HG1(1||bsn)γ·gsk (
1
nym
)γ ∧
Ci = HG1(1||bsni)γ·gsk (
1
nymi
)γ}(“sign”).
While the proposed scheme successfully removes the static
DH oracle and is provably secure in the UC model, their proto-
col makes different calls to the TPM to prove non-revocation,
and requires the TPM to maintain state (bsn, nym) that it used
in the signing procedure to later create the non-revocation
proofs. Extra TPM commands would be required to implement
this exact behavior in a TPM. In this work, we use the
same core idea but slightly change the communication, such
that we can leverage the flexible TPM.Commit and TPM.Sign
commands and avoid introducing new TPM commands. In
addition, we give the TPM all the input it requires to create the
non-revocation proof, such that it does not need to keep any
state between signing and creating the non-revocation proof.
More precisely, we can construct the non-revocation proof
based on our revised TPM interface using the Prove protocol.
The host obtains Ci and constructs piSRL,i ← (Ci, pi′SRL,i) by
running
(Ci, pi
′
SRL,i)← Prove(hsk , 1G1 , 1||bsn, 1,⊥, γ, 1||bsni,⊥,
{(γ, 1/nym, 1/nymi,⊥)}, “sign”,⊥),
To verify piSRL,i in the VERIFY algorithm, one parses
piSRL,i = (Ci, pi
′
SRL,i), checks that Ci 6= 1G1 , and verifies pi′SRL,i
w.r.t. (Ci, 1||bsni, nymi, nym), where (1||bsni, nymi) ∈ SRL.
Note that since signature-based revocation is independent
of the concrete PBSign scheme used for the membership
credential, the above proof instantiation and the revocation
checks in VERIFY are the same for the q-SDH-based and
LRSW-based schemes.
Concrete Instantiations. The description of the JOIN and
SIGN protocols and the VERIFY and LINK algorithms are
given in Fig. 4, using an abstract NIZK proof statement for
picred , and a generic partially-blind signature scheme PBSign
for obtaining the membership credential. The concrete in-
stantiation for this proof depends on the instantiation used
for the PBSign scheme. In the following two sections we
describe how PBSign and picred can be instantiated with a q-
SDH-based scheme (BBS+ signature [18]) and a LRSW-based
scheme (CL-signature [17]) respectively. The latter uses a
novel way to blindly issue CL signatures, which is significantly
more efficient than previous approaches and is of independent
interest.
For both concrete instantiations we assume the availability
of system parameters consisting of a security parameter τ , a
bilinear group G1,G2,GT of prime order p with generators g1
of G1 and g2 of G2 and bilinear map e, generated w.r.t τ , and
with g¯ denoting the fixed generator used by the TPMs. Note
that we will not repeat the parts of the DAA protocol that are
independent of the PBSign instantiation, such as the signature-
based revocation, the revocation checks within VERIFY, and
the LINK protocol.
5.2.1 q-SDH-based DAA Instantiation
Our q-SDH-based scheme is most similar to the scheme
by Camenisch et al. [10], which in turn propose a provably
secure version of the scheme by Brickell and Li [3], which
is standardized as mechanism 3 in ISO/IEC 20008-2 [31]. In
addition, their and our scheme support membership creden-
tials with selective attribute disclosure, similar to DAA with
Attributes as proposed by Chen and Urian [32].
We now show how to instantiate PBSign and the affected
proofs with q-SDH-based BBS+ signatures yielding a prov-
ably secure q-SDH-based DAA scheme ΠqSDH−DAA using the
revised TPM 2.0 interfaces proposed in Sec. 4.
SETUP: The issuer generates its key pair (ipk , isk) as follows:
• Choose (h0, . . . , hL) ←$ GL+11 , x ←$ Zp, set X ← gx2 and
X ′ ← gx1 , and prove piipk ←$ SPK{x : X = gx2 ∧ X ′ =
gx1}(“setup”).
• Set ipk ← (h0, . . . , hL, X,X ′, piipk ), and isk ← x.
Protocol participants, when retrieving ipk , will verify piipk .
JOIN: Here we show how the host obtains the proof pitpk
from the TPM and how the issuer computes the membership
credential using the BBS+ signature scheme. For this scheme,
we set g˜ = g¯, so tpk = tpk ′ and we can simplify pitpk to
pitpk ← SPK∗{tsk : tpk = g¯tsk}(“join”,n).
• The host obtains pitpk by calling
(∗, pitpk )← Prove(0, tpk ,⊥, 1,⊥, 1,⊥,⊥, ∅,⊥, (“join”,n)).
• The issuer computes the membership credential cred ←
PBSign(isk , gpk , attrs) on the joint public key gpk and
a set of attributes attrs = (a1, . . . , aL) with isk = x as
follows: It chooses a random (e, s) ∈ Z2p, and derives
A← (g1 · hs0 · gpk ·
L∏
i=1
haii )
1
e+x .
That is, the issuer creates a standard BBS+ signature on the
message (gsk , a1, . . . , aL), where gsk = tsk+hsk is blindly
signed in form of gpk = g¯gsk . It sets cred ← (A, e, s).
• The host upon receiving (cred , attrs) from the issuer,
computes b ← g1 · hs0 · gpk ·
∏L
i=1 h
ai
i , and checks that
e(A,Xge2) = e(b, g2). Finally, it sets cred
′ ← ((A, e, s), b).
SIGN: A platform holding a membership credential cred ′ =
((A, e, s), b) on platform key gsk and attributes attrs can sign
message m w.r.t. basename bsn , attribute disclosure (D, I),
and signature-based revocation list SRL. As shown in Fig. 4,
each signature σ contains a proof of a membership credential
picred w.r.t. the pseudonym nym = HG1(1||bsn)gsk , which are
computed as follows:
• The host first randomizes the BBS+ credential ((A, e, s), b):
Choose r1 ←$ Z∗p, r2 ←$ Zp, r3 ← 1r1 , set A′ ← Ar1 , A¯ ←
A′−e · br1(= A′x), b′ ← br1 · h−r20 , and s′ ← s − r2 · r3.
The host and TPM then jointly compute the following proof
pi′cred . We denote by D¯ = {1, . . . , L}\D the indices of
attributes that are not disclosed.
pi′cred ← SPK∗{(gsk , {ai}i∈D¯, e, r2, r3, s′) :
g−11
∏
i∈D
hi
−ai = b′−r3hs
′
0 g¯
gsk
∏
i∈D¯
hi
ai ∧
nym = HG1(1||bsn)gsk ∧
A¯/b′ = A′−e · hr20 }((“sign”, (D, I),SRL),m)
This proof and pseudonym are computed by running
(nym, pi′cred)← Prove(hsk , d,⊥, 1,⊥, 1, 1||bsn,
A¯/b′, S, (“sign”, (D, I),SRL),m),
with d ← g−11
∏
i∈D h
−ai
i and the set
of all witnesses for the proof: S ←
{(−e, 1G1 , 1G1 , A′), (r2, 1G1 , 1G1 , h0), (−r3, b′, 1G1 , 1G1),
(s′, h0, 1G1 , 1G1)} ∪ {(ai, hi, 1G1 , 1G1)}i∈D¯. The host then
sets picred ← (A¯, A′, b′, pi′cred).
VERIFY: To verify picred = (A¯, A′, b′, pi′cred) w.r.t.
(ipk , σ,m, bsn, (D, I),RL,SRL) and nym, parse ipk =
(h0, . . . , hL, X,X
′, piipk ), check that A′ 6= 1G1 and
e(A′, X) = e(A¯, g2), and verify pi′cred with respect to mes-
sage m, basename bsn , attribute disclosure (D, I), signature
revocation list SRL, randomized credential (A¯, A′, b′), and
pseudonym nym.
5.2.2 LRSW-based DAA Instantiation
We now demonstrate that an LRSW-based DAA scheme
can be built on top of the new TPM interface. Our scheme
is similar to the scheme by Chen, Page, and Smart [23],
standardized as mechanism 4 of ISO/IEC 20008-2 [31], but
includes the fixes to flaws pointed out by Bernhard et al. [33]
and Camenisch et al. [9].
Note, for the sake of efficiency we do not include attributes
in this scheme. Selective attribute disclosure can be supported
using the extension by Chen and Urian [32], but it comes with
a significant loss in efficiency. When attributes are required,
the q-SDH-based scheme should be used.
A New Approach to Issue CL-Signatures. The main differ-
ence to the schemes by Bernhard et al. [33] and Camenisch
et al. [9] is the way we prevent a static DH oracle when
the membership credentials are generated. In LRSW-based
schemes, cred is a CL-signature (a, b, c, d) on gsk , where for
blind signing the issuer chooses α←$ Z∗p and sets
a← g¯α, b← ay, c← ax · gpkα·xy, d← gpkα·y,
with (x, y) denoting the issuer’s signing key and gpk = g¯gsk
the platform public key. The DH oracle arises as the TPM
must later prove knowledge of d = bgsk , and b is a value
chosen by the issuer.
The schemes by Bernhard et al. [33] and Camenisch et
al. [9] avoid such an oracle by letting the issuer prove
pi ←$ SPK{(α · y) : b = g¯α·y ∧ d = gpkα·y}. Thus, the issuer
proves that it correctly computed d = bgsk , which shows the
TPM that it can use b as a generator without forming a static
DH oracle (as the issuer already knows d). The TPM must
therefore verify pi, store (b, d) along with its key, and only
use these values in the subsequent SPKs.
While allowing for a security proof under the standard DL
assumption, realizing this approach would require significant
changes to the TPM interface to verify and store the additional
key material. Further, the TPM 2.0 specification aimed to
provide a generic interface for a number of protocols, and
adding LRSW-DAA specific changes would thwart this effort.
Our goal is to keep the TPM protocol as generic and simple
as possible, and we propose a novel and more elegant solution
that avoids the DH oracle without requiring the TPM to verify
a zero-knowledge proof. For the sake of simplicity we assume
gsk = tsk for the exposition of our core idea, and only include
the split-key approach gsk = tsk + hsk in the full protocol
specification.
The issuer chooses a random nonce n and we derive b ←
HG1(0||n). The TPM receives n , derives b and sends d = bgsk
to the issuer. Note that d does not leak information about
gsk when we model HG1 as a random oracle. The issuer then
completes the credential by computing
a← b1/y, c← (a · d)x.
It is easy to see that the values (a, b, c, d) derived in that
way, form a standard CL signature on gsk as in the existing
schemes. Note that we now use HG1 in both the join protocol
and to create pseudonyms while signing. We prefix the hash
computation with a bit to distinguish these cases, to prevent
losing privacy when signing with a basename bsn equal to
nonce n .
This new blind issuance protocol is provably secure under
the generalized LRSW assumption as introduced in Sec. 2,
which we prove as one step in our full security proof in the
full version of this paper. We need the generalized LRSW
assumption, as the issuer already commits to values a and b
before getting the d value and computing c based on d. One
can easily modify the issuance scheme to be secure under the
standard LRSW assumption though, one needs to prepend one
extra round between the TPM and the issuer before running
the issuance as described above. Therein, the issuer sends a
nonce n ′ to the TPM, and the TPM responds with a proof
pi ← SPK∗{gsk : gpk = g¯gsk }(n ′). The issuer verifies pi
and then continues with the issuance as described above. In
the security proof this allows to extract gsk from pi and we
can obtain the full signature (a, b, c) on gsk from the LRSW
oracle. Note that this extra round can be implemented with
our revised TPM interface as well, but slightly reduces the
efficiency of the overall JOIN protocol.
We now describe how this new issuance protocol is used
in the LRSW-based instantiation of our DAA protocol. We
denote the DAA protocol given in Fig. 4 instantiated with the
LRSW-based membership credential and the proofs described
below as ΠLRSW−DAA.
SETUP: The issuer generates its key pair (ipk , isk) as follows:
• Choose x, y ←$ Z∗p, set X ← gx2 , Y ← gy2 , and compute
piipk ←$ SPK{(x, y) : X = gx2 ∧ Y = gy2}(“setup”).
• Set ipk ← (X,Y, piipk ), and isk ← (x, y).
When first getting the issuer public key, protocol participants
will check Y 6= 1G2 and verify piipk .
JOIN: Opposed to the q-SDH-based protocol, we make use of
the flexibility for the generator of the platform’s key. That is,
instead of using g¯ we will use g˜ = HG1(0||n) which will also
serve as the b-value in the improved issuance of CL credentials
as described above.
• First, upon receiving n from the issuer, the host and TPM
create gpk , tpk ′, pitpk , pigpk based on g˜ = b = HG1(0||n).
Recall that the TPM authenticates only the value tpk = g¯tsk ,
so the TPM must prove that tpk ′ = g˜tsk uses the same tsk
as in its authenticated public key tpk :
pitpk ← SPK∗{tsk : tpk = g¯tsk ∧ tpk ′ = g˜tsk}(“join”,n)
The TPM’s key contribution tpk ′ and the proof pitpk are
created via the Prove protocol for the following input:
(tpk ′, pitpk )← Prove(0, tpk ,⊥, 1,⊥, 1, (0||n),
⊥, ∅,⊥, (“join”,n))
The host then picks a key hsk , computes gpk = tpk ′ ·
g˜hsk and pigpk (as described in Fig. 4) and finally sends
tpk , tpk ′, pitpk , pigpk , gpk to the issuer.
• Then, the issuer blindly completes the CL signature on
gsk = tsk + hsk as described above: the issuer computes
a ← g˜1/y , c ← (a · gpk)x, and sets cred ← (a, c). Note
that gpk = g˜gsk = bgsk , so we can use this as the d-value
of the credential.
• The host upon receiving cred = (a, c) from the issuer
verifies that a 6= 1G1 , e(a, Y ) = e(g˜, g2), and e(c, g2) =
e(a ·gpk , X). Finally, the host sets cred ′ = (a, g˜, c, gpk ,n).
SIGN: We now describe how to instantiate the membership
proof picred for such CL signatures with our TPM methods.
• The host retrieves the join record (hsk , cred ′) and random-
izes the CL credential cred ′ = (a, g˜, c, gpk ,n) by r ←$ Z∗p
and setting a′ ← ar, g˜′ ← g˜r, c′ ← cr, gpk ′ ← gpkr.
• The host and TPM then jointly compute nym ←
HG1(1||bsn)gsk for gsk = tsk + hsk and prove knowledge
of a CL credential on gsk by creating:
pi′cred ← SPK∗{(gsk) : gpk ′ = g˜′gsk ∧
nym = HG1(1||bsn)gsk}((“sign”,SRL),m)
This proof and pseudonym nym are computed by
(nym, pi′cred)← Prove(hsk , gpk ′, (0||n), r,⊥, 1, (1||bsn),
⊥, ∅, (“sign”,SRL),m).
Finally, the host sets picred ← (a′, g˜′, c′, gpk ′, pi′cred).
VERIFY: To verify picred = (a′, g˜′, c′, gpk ′, pi′cred) w.r.t.
(ipk , σ,m, bsn, (D, I),RL,SRL) and nym, parse ipk =
(X,Y, piipk ), check that a′ 6= 1G1 , e(a′, Y ) = e(g˜′, g2), and
e(c′, g2) = e(a′ · gpk ′, X), and verify pi′cred with respect to
(m, bsn,SRL, g˜′, gpk ′, nym).
5.3 Security Properties of our Schemes
In this section we informally discuss the security of our
DAA schemes. For the formal security proof we refer to the
full version of this paper.
Theorem 1 (Informal). Protocol ΠLRSW−DAA is a secure
anonymous attestation scheme under the Generalized LRSW
and Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions in the random
oracle model.
Theorem 2 (Informal). Protocol ΠqSDH−DAA is a secure
anonymous attestation scheme under the q-SDH and De-
cisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions in the random oracle
model.
The proofs of these two theorems are quite similar. In the
following we give a proof sketch that treats both schemes at
the same time, pointing out the differences when they arise.
Proof (Sketch). For each of the properties stated in Sec-
tion 5.1, we argue why our schemes satisfy them. The actual
security proof is structured quite differently as there we
prove that an environment cannot distinguish between the
interactions with the real world parties and with the ideal
specification with a simulator. Nevertheless, the arguments
presented here also appear in the full formal proof.
Unforgeability. First, we argue that the adversary cannot use
a credential from a platform with an honest TPM. In both our
schemes, signatures are signature proofs of knowledge of the
platform secret key tsk + hsk , as defined in (1). This means
that from Lemma 2 we can directly conclude that the adversary
cannot use the credential of a platform with an honest TPM.
Second, the adversary cannot use a revoked credential on
the key gsk by a corrupt platform. For private-key based
revocation, the platform proves that nym = HG1(1||bsn)gsk
is correctly constructed, and the revocation check will reject
signatures with that pseudonym. If signature-based revocation
is used, a pair (bsni, nymi = HG1(1||bsn)gsk ) is included in
SRL. In proof pi′SRL,i, the adversary must prove that his gsk
is different than the one used in nymi, which contradicts the
soundness of the zero knowledge proof.
It remains to show that the adversary cannot create signa-
tures using a forged credential. For ΠqSDH−DAA, this clearly
breaks the existential unforgeability of the BBS+ signature
scheme, which is proven under the q-SDH assumption. For
ΠLRSW−DAA, we have to show that credentials are unforgeable
under the generalized LRSW assumption. For this, we simulate
the issuer with a generalized LRSW instance. When the join
protocol starts, the issuer asks Oa,bX for (a, b). It chooses a
fresh nonce n and programs the random oracle HG1(0||n) = b.
When it receives proofs pitpk , pigpk it extracts tsk and hsk and
sets gsk = tsk+hsk . It then calls OcX,Y on gsk to complete the
credential. Now, when the adversary creates a signature with
a forged credential, we can extract a credential (a∗, b∗, c∗) on
the fresh gsk∗ breaking the generalized LRSW assumption.
Non-Frameability. An honest platform cannot be framed,
under the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption (which is
implied by the assumptions we make). The host sets gpk and g˜
based on given the DL instance, and must simulate pigpk as it
does not know hsk such that gpk = tpk · g˜hsk . When signing,
the host also simulates the zero-knowledge proofs. Now, if
an adversary creates a signature that links to a signature of
the honest platform, it must prove knowledge of the discrete
logarithm of gsk . We rewind to extract and break the DL
assumption.
Strong Privacy. Our DAA schemes fulfill strong privacy,
meaning that privacy is guaranteed as long as the host is
honest, i.e., even when the TPM involved in the generation of
an attestation is malicious. By Lemma 1, the proofs created
together with a (malicious) TPM are zero knowledge. This
means we can simulate these proofs without the adversary
noticing the difference. Further, note that a platform key gsk =
tsk + hsk is uniformly distributed over Zp as the host picks
hsk uniformly at random from Zp. To prove that signatures
are unlinkable, we let honest hosts pick a fresh key gsk every
time they sign with a new basename. This is indistinguishable
using a hybrid argument, where in the i-th hop, we use a fresh
key for bsni. Every hop is indistinguishable from the previous
one under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
In a nutshell, the latter is proved as follows. Upon receiving
a DDH instance (α, β, γ), program the random oracle so that
HG1(1||bsni) ← β. The host sets α as the gpk value and
simulates proof pigpk . When signing, the host simulates the
proof of knowledge and sets nym ← γ. If the DDH instance
is a DDH tuple, the same key was used to sign, and if it is
not a DDH tuple, a fresh key was used.
Signatures are now done using a fresh key for each base-
name and the proofs are simulated, therefore no adversary can
possibly break the anonymity of signatures.
6. DAA WITH FORWARD ANONYMITY
An important reason to remove the DH oracle in the TPM
interfaces is that such an oracle prevents forward anonymity.
As Xi et al. [8] point out, a host that becomes corrupted can
test whether signatures were generated by the embedded TPM
using the DH oracle.
Modeling the property of forward anonymity requires one
to consider adaptive corruptions, i.e., a signature made by
a host should remain anonymous even when at some later
point the host becomes corrupted. A property-based notion
for this was formally introduced by Xi et al. [8]. However,
extending our ideal specification to also provide this property
is nontrivial. First, to enable forward anonymity, the DAA
scheme must allow one to create signatures w.r.t. no basename,
i.e., bsn = ⊥ and forward anonymity only holds for such
signatures. Otherwise, a host that becomes corrupt could
trivially link previous signatures generated for some basename
bsn 6= ⊥, by simply requesting a new signature w.r.t. bsn
and test for relation via the link algorithm. This means we
would have to remove signature-based revocation from our
security model. Second, our formal security proof considers
static corruptions, whereas forward anonymity is inherently
about dynamic corruptions. Indeed, realizing a scheme secure
w.r.t. dynamic corruptions would be much less efficient than
the scheme we present in this paper.
Despite this, the TPM interfaces we define allow one
to build a DAA scheme with forward anonymity (however,
the other security properties hold only in presence of static
corruptions). That is, if we remove signature-based revocation
from our DAA protocols, they fulfill the notion of forward
security by Xi et al. For LRSW-based DAA, signing with
bsn = ⊥ means that nym is omitted from the signature and
proof picred . For q-SDH-based DAA, if bsn = ⊥ then nym is
replaced by jgsk , where j is taken uniformly at random from
G1 by the TPM, as in the q-SDH-based scheme by Brickell
and Li [3].
Proving the resulting scheme to be forward anonymous
would work as follows. The forward anonymity game consid-
ers a corrupt issuer. This means A can instruct platforms to
join, and A runs the issuer side of the protocol. A can request
complete signatures from joined platforms. Next, A submits
the identities of two platforms and a message. The challenger
chooses one of the two platforms at random and returns a
signature on the given message with basename bsn = ⊥ on
behalf of the chosen platform. The game now models the fact
that the host becomes corrupted by giving A access to the
TPM commands of the platforms, and A’s task is to find out
which of the two platforms created the signature.
For both schemes, we can prove forward anonymity un-
der the DDH assumption, using a similar proof strategy as
for strong privacy. First, the challenger answers all oracles
correctly. Next, we modify the game slightly. The challenge
signature is now computed under a fresh key, instead of the
key of one of the two platforms that A submitted. In this
modified game, no adversary can win with probability better
than 12 , as the bit that A has to guess is independent of A’s
view. This means A can only have non-negligible advantage
by distinguishing the two games. As argued in the strong
privacy proof in Sect. 5.3, the modification in the games is
unnoticeable under the DDH assumption. showing that our
protocols without signature-based revocation satisfy forward
anonymity under the DDH assumption.
7. OTHER USES OF OUR TPM INTERFACES
In many protocols, the user would like to store his keys
in secure hardware rather than on a normal computer. This
way, the keys are secure and some security is preserved as
long as the trusted hardware is not compromised, even when
the computer is compromised. This section shows that due
to the generic design of our TPM interface, it can be used
to secure the keys of other cryptographic protocols. As an
example, we consider U-Prove and e-cash with keys stored
in a TPM, such that an attacker cannot use a user’s U-Prove
credential or e-cash wallet without access to the TPM. We
discuss these constructions here only informally, i.e., without
providing a security proof, as a formal treatment would require
a new security model and a detailed proof, which is beyond
the scope of this paper. For ease of presentation, we place the
full key in the TPM, although we could split the key over the
TPM and host as in our DAA schemes.
7.1 Device Bound U-Prove
U-Prove [7] is an attribute-based credential system where
credential issuance and credential presentation are unlinkable.
In the issuance protocol, the user receives a credential with
public key h = (g0gx11 . . . g
xn
n g
xd
d )
α, where x1, . . . , xn are
the attribute values of the user, and xd is the device secret.
The device secret makes sure that a secure device must be
present to use the credential. To show the credential, the user
must prove knowledge of x1, . . . , xn, xd, and α such that
g0 = g
x1
1 . . . g
xn
n g
xd
d ·h−1/α, with the help of the secure device.
Our proposed changes for TPM 2.0 allow the TPM
to be used as secure device for U-Prove. The value
xd will be the TPM secret key, and generator gd must
be the generator g¯ known to the TPM. Then, the
credential presentation proof SPK∗{(x1, . . . , xn, xd, α) :
g0 = g
x1
1 . . . g
xn
n g
xd
d · h−1/α} can be constructed by
computing (nym, pi) ← Prove(0, g0,⊥, 1,⊥, 1,⊥,⊥,
{(a1, g1,⊥,⊥), . . . , (an, gn,⊥,⊥), (1/α, h,⊥,⊥)},⊥,⊥).
By Lemma 3, such proofs can only be made with a
contribution from the TPM, so one’s credentials cannot be
stolen, unless the attacker can access the TPM.
7.2 Compact E-Cash
Compact E-Cash [11] allows users to withdraw coins from
a bank, and later anonymously spend the coins. The protocol
assumes that every user has a key pair (skU , pkU = gskU ) with
which it can authenticate towards the bank. To withdraw 2l
coins, the user first authenticates towards the bank by proving
knowledge of skU . The user picks wallet secrets s, l, where
the bank adds randomness to s, and the bank places signature
σ on committed values skU , s, and l, using a CL signature.
The result of the withdraw protocol is a wallet (skU , s, t, σ, J),
where J is an l-bit counter.
To spend a coin at merchant M , the user computes R ←
H(pkM , info), where the merchant provides info. Next, the
user computes a coin serial number S ← g 1s+J+1 and value
T ← pkU · g Rt+J+1 which is used to detect double spending of
coins. Finally, it proves
SPK{(J, skU , s, t, σ) : 0 ≤ J < 2l ∧ S = g 1s+J+1 ∧
T ← pkU · g Rt+J+1 ∧ Ver(pkB , (skU , s, t), σ) = 1}
We can instantiate Compact E-Cash such that users can
securely store their secret key skU inside a TPM, using a
trick similar as in our LRSW-based DAA scheme. To create
its keys, the bank picks secret key (x, y, z1, z2, z3)←$ Z5p and
sets public key X ← gx2 , Y ← gy2 , Z1 ← gz12 , Z2 ← gz22 , and
Z3 ← gz32 . The withdrawal of coins start by the bank picking a
fresh nonce n , and sending n , b← H(n), a← b1/y , Ai ← azi
and Bi ← bzi for i = 1, 2, 3 to the user. The user authenticates
by proving pkU = gskU1 ∧ d = bskU , as in our LRSW-based
DAA scheme. In addition, it picks s′, t, and r, and commits to
them using generators B1, B2, and B3: C ← Bs′1 Bt2Br3 . The
user sends C with a proof of knowledge of (s′, t, r) to the
bank. The bank now adds randomness to s′′ to s′ by setting
C ′ ← C ·Bs′′1 and signs skU , s = s′+ s′′, t, and r, by setting
c← (a · d ·C ′y)x = ax+xy(m+z1s+z2t+z3r). The user now has
signature σ = (a,A1, A2, A3, b, B1, B2, B3, c, d).
To spend a coin, the user must compute R, S, and T ,
and prove that everything is correctly computed, as described
above. The TPM holding skU is only involved in proving that
σ is a valid CL signature on (skU , s, t, r). It randomizes the
signature by taking ρ ← Z∗p and setting a′ ← aρ, A′i ←
Aρi , b
′ ← bρ, B′i ← Bρi , c′ ← cρ. To prove this randomized
signature signs (skU , s, t, r), the user creates the following
proof:
SPK∗{(skU , s, t, r) : e(c′, g2)/e(a′, X) =
e(b′, X)skU e(B′1, X)
se(B′2, X)
te(B′3, X)
r}.
This proof can be created with the TPM using
(∗, pi) ← Prove(0, e(c′, g2)/e(a′, X),n, ρ,X, 1,⊥,⊥,
{(s, e(B′1, X),⊥,⊥), (t, e(B′2, X),⊥,⊥)},⊥,⊥). Now, by
Lemma 3, a wallet can only be used if the attacker has access
to the TPM holding skU .
8. CONCLUSION
The TPM is a widely deployed security chip that can be
embedded in platforms such that the platform can, among
other things, anonymously attest to a remote verifier that
it is in a secure state. Unfortunately, the current TPM 2.0
specification for DAA contains several flaws: it contains a
static DH oracle towards the host and attestations built on
top of this interface cannot be proven to be unforgeable. Fixes
proposed in the literature are either impossible to implement
within the constraints of the TPM, limit the functionality of
the TPM interface, or open a subliminal channel that allows a
malicious TPM to embed information in attestations, harming
the privacy of the host.
We presented a revised TPM 2.0 interface and a Prove
protocol for the host that allows the platform to create provably
secure signature proofs of knowledge. The interface does not
contain a DH oracle, and a corrupt TPM cannot break the
zero-knowledge property of the resulting proofs.
Using the Prove protocol, we constructed two provably
secure DAA schemes, one based on the LRSW assumption
and one on the q-SDH assumption, including DAA extensions
featuring signature-based revocation and attributes. Further-
more, we have shown that our TPM interface supports DAA
schemes with forward anonymity and can be used to protect
keys for other cryptographic schemes, such as e-cash and U-
Prove. These latter applications were only shown informally,
it remains future work to formally treat these applications.
The Trusted Computing Group has already adopted some of
our proposed changes and is currently reviewing the remaining
ones. It is our aim to bring these improvements to all the
existing attestation standards, such as EPID, ISO/IEC 20008-
2, and FIDO attestation, such that all implementations are
provably secure and can make use of TPMs.
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APPENDIX A
FORMAL SECURITY MODEL
This section introduces our formal security model of DAA,
which is based on the definition by Camenisch et al. [9], [10],
[24]. At the end of this section we also compare the captured
privacy guarantees in the presence of subverted TPM with
the existing privacy notions, and to optimal privacy [24] in
particular.
A1 Universal Composability
Our security definition has the form of an ideal functionality
Fpdaa+ in the Universal Composability (UC) framework [30].
In UC, an environment E gives inputs to the protocol parties
and receives their outputs. In the real world, honest parties ex-
ecute the protocol, over a network controlled by an adversary
A, who can also communicate freely with the environment
E . In the ideal world, honest parties forward their inputs to
the ideal functionality F. The ideal functionality internally
performs the defined task and generates outputs for the honest
parties. As F performs the task at hand in an ideal fashion,
i.e., F is secure by construction.
Informally, a protocol Π is said to securely realize an ideal
functionality F if the real world is as secure as the ideal
world. To prove that statement one has to show that for every
adversary A attacking the real world, there exists an ideal
world attacker or simulator S that performs an equivalent
attack on the ideal world. More precisely, Π securely realizes
F if for every adversary A, there exists a simulator S such
that no environment E can distinguish the real world (with Π
and A) from the ideal world (with F and S).
A2 Session Identifiers and Input/Output
In the UC model, different instances of the protocol are
distinguished with session identifiers. Here we use session
identifiers of the form sid = (I, sid′) for some issuer I
and a unique string sid ′. To allow several sub-sessions for
the join and sign related interfaces we use unique sub-session
identifiers jsid and ssid .
Every party can give different inputs to the protocol. We
distinguish these by adding different labels to these inputs,
e.g., the host can give an input labeled with JOIN to request
to join, and an input labeled with SIGN to start signing a
message. Outputs are labeled in a similar way.
A3 Ideal Functionality Fpdaa+
This section formally introduces our ideal DAA function-
ality Fpdaa+, which defines DAA with attributes, signature-
based revocation, and strong privacy. It is based on Fpdaa
and F ldaa+ by Camenisch et al. [10], [24]. We now give an
informal overview of the interfaces of Fpdaa+, and present the
full definition in Fig. 5.
Setup. The SETUP interface on input sid = (I, sid′) initiates
a new session for the issuer I and expects the adversary
to provide algorithms (ukgen, sig, ver, link, identify) that will
be used inside the functionality. ukgen creates a new key
gsk and a tracing trapdoor τ that allows Fpdaa+ to trace
signatures generated with gsk . sig, ver, and link are used
by Fpdaa+ to create, verify, and link signatures, respectively.
Finally, identify allows to verify whether a signature belongs
to a certain tracing trapdoor. This allows Fpdaa+ to perform
multiple consistency checks and enforce the desired non-
frameability and unforgeability properties.
Note that the ver and link algorithms assist the functionality
only for signatures that are not generated by Fpdaa+ itself. For
signatures generated by the functionality, Fpdaa+ will enforce
correct verification and linkage using its internal records.
While ukgen and sig are probabilistic algorithms, the other
ones are required to be deterministic. The link algorithm also
has to be symmetric, i.e., for all inputs it must hold that
link(σ,m, σ′,m′, bsn)↔ link(σ′,m′, σ,m, bsn).
Join. A host Hj can request to join with a TPMMi using the
JOIN interface. The issuer is asked to approve the join request,
and choose the platform’s attributes. Fpdaa+ is parametrized
by L and {Ai}0<i≤L, that offer support for attributes. L is
the amount of attributes every credential contains and Ai
the set from which the i-th attribute is taken. When the
issuer approves with attributes attrs ∈ A1 × . . . × AL,
the functionality stores an internal membership record for
Mi,Hj , attrs in Members indicating that from now on that
platform is allowed to create attestations.
If the host is corrupt, the adversary must provide Fpdaa+
with a tracing trapdoor τ . This value is stored along in
the membership record and allows the functionality to check
via the identify function whether signatures were created
by this platform. Fpdaa+ uses these checks to ensure non-
frameability and unforgeability whenever it creates or veri-
fies signatures. To ensure that the adversary cannot provide
bad trapdoors that would break the completeness or non-
frameability properties, Fpdaa+ checks the legitimacy of τ
via the “macro” function CheckTtdCorrupt. This function
checks that for all previously generated or verified signatures
for which Fpdaa+ has already seen another matching tracing
trapdoor τ ′ 6= τ , the new trapdoor τ is not identified as a
matching key as well. CheckTtdCorrupt is defined as follows:
CheckTtdCorrupt(τ) =6 ∃(σ,m, bsn) :
(
(
〈σ,m, bsn, ∗, ∗〉 ∈ Signed ∨
〈σ,m, bsn, ∗, 1〉 ∈ VerResults
)
∧
∃τ ′ :
(
τ 6= τ ′ ∧ (〈∗, ∗, τ ′〉 ∈ Members ∨
〈∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, τ ′〉 ∈ DomainKeys) ∧
identify(σ,m, bsn, τ) = identify(σ,m, bsn, τ ′) = 1
))
Sign. After joining, a host Hj can use the SIGN interface to
request a signature on a message m with respect to basename
bsn while proving a certain predicate p holds for his attributes
and proving that he is not revoked by signature revocation list
SRL. The signature will only be created when the TPM Mi
explicitly agrees to signing m, a join record forMi,Hj , attrs
in Members exists such that attrs satisfy p (if the issuer is
honest), and the platform is not revoked by SRL.
When a platform wants to sign message m w.r.t. a fresh
basename bsn , Fpdaa+ generates a new key gsk (and tracing
trapdoor τ ) via ukgen and then signs m with that key. The
functionality also stores the fresh key (gsk , τ) together with
bsn in DomainKeys, and reuses the same key when the
platform wishes to sign repeatedly under the same base-
name. Using fresh keys for every signature naturally enforces
the desired privacy guarantees: the signature algorithm does
not receive any identifying information as input, and thus
the created signatures are guaranteed to be anonymous (or
pseudonymous in case bsn is reused).
To guarantee non-frameability and completeness,
our functionality further checks that every freshly
generated key, tracing trapdoor and signature does not
falsely match with any existing signature or key. More
precisely, Fpdaa+ first uses the CheckTtdHonest macro
to verify whether the new key does not match to any
existing signature. CheckTtdHonest is defined as follows:
CheckTtdHonest(τ) =
∀〈σ,m, bsn,M,H〉 ∈ Signed : identify(σ,m, bsn, τ) = 0 ∧
∀〈σ,m, bsn, ∗, 1〉 ∈ VerResults : identify(σ,m, bsn, τ) = 0
Likewise, before outputting σ, the functionality checks that
no one else already has a key which would match this newly
generated signature.
Finally, for ensuring unforgeability, the signed message,
basename, attribute predicate, signature revocation list, and
platform identity are stored in Signed, which will be used
when verifying signatures.
Verify. Signatures can be verified by any party using
the VERIFY interface. Fpdaa+ uses its internal Signed,
Members, and DomainKeys records to enforce unforgeabil-
ity and non-frameability. It uses the tracing trapdoors τ stored
in Members and DomainKeys to find out which platform
created this signature. If no match is found and the issuer is
honest, the signature is a forgery and rejected by Fpdaa+. If
the signature to be verified matches the tracing trapdoor of
some platform with an honest host, but the signing records do
not show that they signed this message w.r.t. the basename,
attribute predicate, and signature revocation list, Fpdaa+ again
considers this to be a forgery and rejects. If the platform has
an honest TPM, only checks on the message and basename
are made. If the records do not reveal any issues with the
signature, Fpdaa+ uses the ver algorithm to obtain the final
result.
The verify interface also supports verifier-local revocation.
The verifier can input a revocation list RL containing tracing
trapdoors, and signatures matching any of those trapdoors are
no longer accepted.
Link. Using the LINK interface, any party can check whether
two signatures (σ, σ′) on messages (m,m′) respectively, gen-
erated with the same basename bsn originate from the same
platform or not. Fpdaa+ again uses the tracing trapdoors
τ stored in Members and DomainKeys to check which
platforms created the two signatures. If they are the same,
Fpdaa+ outputs that they are linked. If it finds a platform that
signed one, but not the other, it outputs that they are unlinked,
which prevents framing of platforms with an honest host.
Conventions. The full definition of Fpdaa+ is presented in
Fig. 5. We use a number of conventions to simplify the defini-
tion of Fpdaa+. First, we require that identify(σ,m, bsn, τ) =
0 if σ or τ is ⊥. Second, whenever we need approval from the
adversary to proceed, Fpdaa+ sends an output to the adversary
and waits for a response. This means that in that join or
sign session, no other inputs are accepted except the expected
response from the adversary. Third, if any check that Fpdaa+
makes fails, the sub-session is invalidated and ⊥ is output to
the caller.
A4 Comparison of Fpdaa+ with Previous Definitions
Our functionality Fpdaa+ is based on previous UC-based
DAA functionalities F ldaa [9], F ldaa+ [10] which extends F ldaa
with attributes and signature-based revocation, and Fpdaa [24],
which strengthens the privacy guarantees of F ldaa. We now
show how our functionality compares to these other DAA
functionalities.
Attributes and Signature-based Revocation. Our function-
ality Fpdaa+ supports adding attributes to the membership
credentials, and selectively disclosing attributes when signing,
as well as signature-based revocation. Fpdaa+ can be seen as
Fpdaa extended with attributes and signature based revocations,
in the same way that F ldaa+ adds these features to F ldaa.
Realistic TPM Interfaces. Contrary to the approach of
F ldaa+, in our definition Fpdaa+ the TPM is agnostic of
attributes, predicates or the SRL. That is, when signing it
neither explicitly sees or approves the attributes or SRL. This
reflects that the actual TPM interfaces do not provide any such
outputs or approvals either, and in fact, there is no practical
reason to do so and would only make the TPM interfaces more
complicated. Thus, we opted for adapting the functionality
accordingly.
Similarly, the previous UC-based definitions [9], [10], [24]
let the TPM approve both the message and basename for which
the hosts requests as signature. In this definition, the TPM is
only responsible for approving the message being signed, but
does no longer receive (and approve) the basename. Again,
this is done to better capture the actual TPM interfaces that
provide such checks only for the message.
The resulting unforgeability and non-frameability guaran-
tees are as follows. No adversary can sign a message m w.r.t.
basename bsn , attribute predicate p, and signature revocation
list SRL, if the host did not sign exactly that. If the TPM
is honest but the host is corrupt, the unforgeability is a bit
weaker, as the TPM only checks the message. Therefore,
if the TPM signed message m, the adversary is allowed to
1) Issuer Setup. On input (SETUP, sid) from issuer I.
• Verify that sid = (I, sid′).
• Output (SETUP, sid) to A and wait for input
(ALG, sid , sig, ver, link, identify, ukgen) from A.
• Check that ver, link, and identify are deterministic.
• Store (sid , sig, ver, link, identify, ukgen) and output
(SETUPDONE, sid) to I.
Join
2) Join Request. On input (JOIN, sid , jsid ,Mi) from host
Hj .
• Output (JOINSTART, sid , jsid ,Mi,Hj) to A and wait for
input (JOINSTART, sid , jsid) from A.
• Create a join session record 〈jsid ,Mi,Hj ,⊥, status〉 with
status ← delivered .
• Abort if I is honest and a record 〈Mi, ∗, ∗〉 ∈ Members
already exists.
• Output (JOINPROCEED, sid , jsid ,Mi) to I.
3) I Join Proceed. On input (JOINPROCEED, sid , jsid , attrs)
from I, with attrs ∈ A1 × . . .× AL.
• Output (JOINCOMPLETE, sid , jsid) to A and wait for input
(JOINCOMPLETE, sid , jsid , τ) from A.
• Update the session record 〈jsid ,Mi,Hj , status〉 with
status = delivered to complete .
• If Hj is honest, set τ ← ⊥.
• Else, verify that the provided tracing trapdoor τ is eligible by
checking CheckTtdCorrupt(τ) = 1.
• Insert 〈Mi,Hj , τ, attrs〉 into Members and output
(JOINED, sid , jsid , attrs) to Hj .
Sign
4) Sign Request. On input (SIGN, sid , ssid ,Mi,m, bsn, p,
SRL) from Hj with p ∈ P.
• If Hj is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj , ∗, attrs〉 with
p(attrs) = 1 exists in Members, abort.
• If Hj is corrupt, set σ ← ⊥. If Hj is honest, generate the
signature for a fresh or established key:
– Retrieve (gsk , τ) from 〈Mi,Hj , bsn, gsk , τ〉 ∈
DomainKeys. If no such entry exists, set (gsk , τ) ←
ukgen(), check CheckTtdHonest(τ) = 1, and store
〈Mi,Hj , bsn, gsk , τ〉 in DomainKeys.
– Compute signature σ ← sig(gsk ,m, bsn, p,SRL), check
ver(σ,m, bsn, p,SRL) = 1.
– Check identify(σ,m, bsn, τ) = 1 and that there is no
(M′,H′) 6= (Mi,Hj) with tracing trapdoor τ ′ registered in
Members or DomainKeys with identify(σ,m, bsn, τ ′) = 1.
• Create a sign session record 〈ssid ,Mi,Hj ,m, bsn, p,SRL, σ,
status〉 with status ← request .
• Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid , ssid ,m) to Mi when it is
honest, and (SIGNPROCEED, sid , ssid ,m, bsn,SRL, σ) when
Mi is corrupt.
5) Sign Proceed. On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid , ssid) from
Mi.
• Look up record 〈ssid ,Mi,Hj ,m, bsn, p,SRL, σ, status〉 with
status = request and update it to status ← complete.
• If I is honest, check that 〈Mi,Hj , ∗, attrs〉 with p(attrs) = 1
exists in Members.
• For every (σ′,m′, bsn ′) ∈ SRL, find all (τi,M′i,H′j)
from 〈M′i,H′j , τi, ∗〉 ∈ Members and 〈M′i,H′j , τi〉 ∈
DomainKeys where identify(σ′,m′, bsn ′, ∗, τi) = 1.
– Check that there are no two distinct τ values matching σ′.
– Check that no pair (τi,Mi,Hj) was found.
• Store 〈σ,m, bsn,Mi,Hj , p,SRL〉 in Signed and output
(SIGNATURE, sid , ssid , σ) to Hj .
Verify & Link
6) Verify. On input (VERIFY, sid ,m, bsn, σ, p,RL,SRL) from
some party V .
• Retrieve all tuples (τi,Mi,Hj) from 〈Mi,Hj , τi, ∗〉 ∈
Members and 〈Mi,Hj , ∗, ∗, τi〉 ∈ DomainKeys where
identify(σ,m, bsn, τi) = 1. Set f ← 0 if at least one of the
following conditions hold:
– More than one τi was found.
– I is honest and no pair (τi,Mi,Hj) was found for which an
entry 〈Mi,Hj , ∗, attrs〉 ∈ Members exists with p(attrs) =
1.
– Mi is honest but no entry 〈∗,m, bsn,Mi,Hj , ∗, ∗〉 ∈
Signed exists.
– Hj is honest but no entry 〈∗,m, bsn,Mi,Hj , p,SRL〉 ∈
Signed exists.
– There is a τ ′ ∈ RL where identify(σ,m, bsn, τ ′) = 1 and no
pair (τi,Mi,Hj) for an honest Hj was found.
– For some matching τi and (σ′,m′, bsn ′) ∈ SRL,
identify(σ′,m′, bsn ′, τi) = 1.
• If f 6= 0, set f ← ver(σ,m, bsn, p,SRL).
• Add 〈σ,m, bsn,RL, f〉 to VerResults and output
(VERIFIED, sid , f) to V .
7) Link. On input (LINK, sid , σ,m, p,SRL, σ′,m′, p′,SRL′, bsn)
from a party V .
• Output ⊥ to V if at least one signature (σ,m, bsn, p,SRL) or
(σ′,m′, bsn, p′,SRL′) is not valid (verified via the VERIFY
interface with RL = ∅).
• For each τi in Members and DomainKeys compute bi ←
identify(σ,m, bsn, τi) and b′i ← identify(σ′,m′, bsn, τi) and
do the following:
– Set f ← 0 if bi 6= b′i for some i.
– Set f ← 1 if bi = b′i = 1 for some i.
• If f is not defined yet, set f ← link(σ,m, σ′,m′, bsn).
• Output (LINK, sid , f) to V .
Fig. 5. Our ideal DAA functionality with strong privacy Fpdaa+
create signatures on m w.r.t. any p and SRL that hold for the
platform (i.e., the platform has the attributes to fulfill p and
is not revoked by SRL). The TPM does not explicitly approve
bsn , but we force the (possibly corrupt) host to choose one
bsn when signing, and signatures can only be valid if the
message-basename combination was signed. Because the TPM
does not explicitly approve the basename, our unforgeability
with an honest TPM and corrupt host is slightly weaker than
previous UC-based definitions [9], [10], [24] where the TPM
must explicitly approve the basename.
When the host is honest but the TPM is corrupt, our
definition also assures unforgeability and non-frameability like
Fpdaa, which provides stronger guarantees than [9] and [10],
where both properties are not ensured when the TPM is
corrupt.
Strong Privacy (vs. Optimal Privacy). Previous DAA
schemes and definitions condition their privacy property on the
honesty of the entire platform, i.e., as soon as either the TPM
or host is corrupt, no privacy is guaranteed anymore. Whereas
the honesty of the host is indeed necessary (a corrupt host can
always break privacy by outputting identifying information),
relying on the honesty of the TPM as well is an unnecessarily
strong assumption. In fact, it even contradicts the original goal
of DAA, namely to provide anonymous attestations without
having to trust the hardware. This mismatch was recently
discussed by Camenisch et al. [24] who propose the notion
of DAA with optimal privacy which must hold even in the
presence of corrupted or subverted TPMs. In contrast to
F ldaa and F ldaa+ where the adversary provides the signature
whenever the host or TPM are corrupt, the functionality with
optimal privacy Fpdaa outputs anonymous signatures as long
as the host is honest. As the signatures are given directly to
the host, the adversary learns nothing about them, even if the
TPM is corrupt.
Unfortunately, the authors also show that optimal privacy
cannot be achieved using constructions where the TPM and
host together create a Fiat-Shamir proof of knowledge, which
rules out the most efficient DAA schemes. The DAA protocol
with optimal privacy proposed in [24] comes with a significant
re-design, shifting most of the computations from the TPM
to the host and would also require new operations to be
implemented on the TPM.
The goal of this work is to obtain the best privacy properties
with as minimal changes to the existing TPM and DAA
specifications as possible. We therefore relax their notion of
optimal privacy, and show how this can be achieved with
modest modifications to the current DAA specifications and
using our proposed TPM interfaces. Roughly, our new privacy
notion – which we term strong privacy – allows the TPM to see
the anonymous signature that is generated by the functionality
and consequently also condition its behavior on the signature
value. Thus, while the actual signature shown to the TPM
is still guaranteed to be anonymous, the TPM can influence
the final distribution of the signatures by blocking certain
signature values (a signature is only output to the host when
corrupt TPM F ldaa, F ldaa+ Fpdaa+ (this work) Fpdaa
standard - - +
isolated - + ++
Fig. 6. Comparison of privacy guarantees for an honest host in the presence of
a corrupt TPM (either corrupt in the standard UC or isolated model of [24]).
the TPM explicitly approved it). A TPM performing such a
“blocking attack” to alter the signature distribution can clearly
be noticed by the host though, and thus, this attack has rather
limited impact in practice.
The main reason why exposing the signature value to the
TPM reduces the privacy guarantees stems from the way UC
models corruption: In the standard UC corruption model, the
adversary is allowed to see all inputs to the party he corrupts.
That is, he will see the signatures given for approval to the
TPM and can later re-identify the platform from the signature.
However, as Camenisch et al. [24] argue, in case of the TPM
this standard UC corruption model gives the adversary much
more power than in reality. In the real world, the TPM is
embedded inside a host who controls all communication with
the outside world, i.e., the adversary cannot communicate
directly with the TPM but only via the (honest) host. To model
such subversion more accurately, [24] introduces isolated
corruptions, where the adversary can specify the code that
the isolated, yet subverted TPM will run, but cannot directly
interact with the isolated TPM.
Applying this concept of isolated corruptions to our notion
of strong privacy then yields significantly stronger privacy
guarantees than with the standard corruption model: In signing
the adversary no longer sees the signature which is only given
to the isolated corrupt TPM. That is, when considering isolated
TPM corruptions, the only difference to the optimal privacy
notion of [24] is the aforementioned “blocking attack” which
allows a corrupt TPM to influence the signature distribution,
but with the risk of being caught by the host. Thus, w.r.t.
isolated corruption, our notion of strong privacy is almost
equivalent to optimal privacy, yet allows for significantly more
efficient instantiation. An overview of the different privacy
guarantees of this and the previous works is given in Fig. 6.
